Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-94-174 *8 September 1994*

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Court Convicts, Sentences Five Ethnic Greeks

AU0709165194 Paris AFP in English 1637 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] Tirana, Sept 7 (AFP)—An Albanian court on Wednesday convicted five members of the Greek minority community in Albania of spying and handed down jail sentences ranging between six and eight years.

Judge Martin Deda said on handing down the sentences that the court had sufficient proof of "ties between the accused... and the Greek secret services and other institutions."

Trial Justified

AU0709154594 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] In the afternoon, the court will announce its final verdict on the criminal activity by the Albanian defendants of Greek origin. Whatever the verdict, the independent Albanian justice is assessed as having proven that the trial has been held above every kind of prejudice and in full conformity with justice regulations. Against Greek claims that this is a political trial, the proceedings held so far do not seem to prove that. The following report is prepared by Arben Karapici:

[Karapici] After 24 days of open and democratic trial, not only the charge itself, but also 41 years of imprisonment weigh down upon the Albanian defendants of Greek origin. This is, at least, the prosecutors' demand, about which the court is expected to announce its final verdict today. Whatever the verdict is, it is Athens that will lose from this trial. Against Greek claims that this is a political trial, the trial did not turn out to be such. As it is not political, our southern neighbor lost its reason in this whirlpool of tension, which was not provoked by Tirana. Greece threw away the prudent and cool-blooded dialogue that the Albanian Government has requested and is still doing so, under the absurd pretext of suspending the trial of five Albanian defendants of Greek origin.

It is already known that dialogue is being refused at any time and under any conditions by the party that has no arguments to support it. The stick that Greece raised against Albania under the pretext of the trial slammed down on the neck of official Athens itself. The European Union, which Greece is amember of, rose against Greek prepotency.

The Hellenistic chauvinist blindness surpassed the limits of known international norms and practices when Athens falsified the report prepared by the CSCE observer, Dr. Jepincki, regarding the trial proceedings in Tirana. Athens's gesture is assessed as insulting and revolting, not only for the CSCE, but because it is the first time in the history of the activities of international institutions that a special report has been stolen and falsified, as Athens stole and falsified this report.

Claims that the rights of the Greek minority are being violated in Albania are shown to be false by the development of education in its mother tongue that the Greek minority enjoys in our country. The example set by the new democratic Albania in this direction should have been set by Athens itself, being the ancient cradle of European democracy. Athens should set such an example when it is a question of fully respecting the rights of minorities in Greece; rights that, to Greece's bad luck, are not as they should be are not in accordance with European standards.

Regarding the Albanian defendants of Greek origin at this trial, their criminal activity creates a dangerous precedence in Greek- Albanian relations and beyond, the indictment states. This also insults the Greek minority living in Albania, which enjoys all its rights. Whatever the verdict, during the final investigation of the criminal case, Albanian independent justice certified that this trial was without any prejudice. Let us hope that Athens will finally call for sound reason.

Berisha Favors Dialogue

AU0709132394 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1730 GMT 6 Sep 94

[Text] President Sali Berisha reconfirmed Albania's commitment for dialogue with Greece, but turned down the conditions set by Greece to suspend the trial of five Albanian nationals of Greek origin.

In an interview with the Swiss newspaper LE NOUVEAU QUOTIDIENNE, he said that no democratic state could suspend trials due to pressure. Berisha also asked Athens not to manipulate the issue of minorities.

Meanwhile, President Berisha warned of the danger of war in the Balkans. If we do not manage to reduce tension, the shadow of war will nourish nationalisms and the situation will really become explosive, he said.

In the interview with LE NOUVEAU QUOTIDIENNE, Berisha also rejected opinions on the existence of a danger for the creation of religious fundamentalisms in Albania. He assessed that religious tolerance is one of Albania's strong pillars.

Arbnori Meets With Greeks

LD0709190394 Tirana Radio Tirana in English 1800 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] The speaker of the Albanian parliament, Peter Arbnori, received Wednesday a group of Greek parliamentarians representatives of all parties, PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement], New Democracy, Democratic Spring, and the Greek Communist Party. The meeting was focused on problems concerning the two countries.

With the ascent of democracy, Mr. Arbnori said to them relations with Greece began to improve. But, after some time they began to deteriorate again. The cause for this

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misunderstanding is the fact that in Greece the south of Albania is being considered as (Voriu) Epirus with all consequences deriving from it.

The game of Voriu Epirus is the game of the Balkan war, he said. I say this to you as a deputy, as a colleague with whom I wish to establish a spirit of understanding to the benefit of our two countries. It's high time to put an end to this absolute farce. I'd wish an end to this put to all claims threatening the integrity of the Republic of Albania. If reasonable act will be undertaken you must be assured that you'll find in Albania a people who appraise [as heard] you and admire you.

Albania has issued a decision on the extension of the right for the education in Greek language for the Greek minority in conformity with the act of Copenhagen. The decision of Albanian Government has been welcomed by a series of countries, democratic institutions of Europe. Meanwhile it's sounds paradoxical that your officials in Athens considered it as a restricted decision.

Do you think that there is a connection between this statement and the demand made to the teachers in the minority regions to lift from our schools the development of Albanian language? This has happened last year. Many schools from the minority region lifted Albanian language from them.

As far as the five Albanian citizens of Greek nationality are concerned, you have attended the trial yourselves. The Albanian court rejected the charge for high treason since the court was an old one, while the other charges for cooperation with the Greek secret police and illegal arms keeping is still in force. [sentence as heard]

We are faced with the arming of the Greek minority with shotguns which to our surprise have been given to them in the framework of aid delivered to them. I assure you that the Greek minority and the whole Albania have been in need of other aid and not for weapons because we unfortunately do not lack them.

You must not impose as a condition the suspension of the trial to start dialogue. A democratic country must never impose such conditions on another democratic country. If Albania was to make a concession any other democratic country would have denounced the Albanian democracy. I sent the best regards to the Greek counterpart Karamanlis with whom I had a cordial talk in The Hague.

The Greek parliamentarians ensured that it is not the priest Sebastianos who makes the policy of Greece but none in any democratic country has the right to condemn people like him.

Our government and the political parties in Greece have no territorial claims. (Voriu) Epirus is simply a historic notion. While the trial against the five minority members has created a lot of problems and it seems to be a political trial, to our opinion the parliamentarians from both countries should try to establish a new good understanding and cooperation atmosphere.

We do not think that the Greek minority is armed by us the Greek parliamentarians said. Why haven't the Albanians protested against this before? We came here to talk even for the problem of our journalists who were considered as persona non grata and the other arrested Konstandin (Karvo) who is not brought to the trial yet.

Arbnori on his part assured the Greek parliamentarians that he was to ask the competent organs about this. Meanwhile he said the Greek mass media must contribute to the improvement of the situation. The people want good understanding for what joins us is stronger than what separates us. We are the most ancient peoples of the Balkans, Mr. Arbnori said.

Greece Recalls Ambassador

AU0709192894 Paris AFP in English 1902 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Excerpts] Tirana, Sept 7 (AFP)—An Albanian court Wednesday convicted five members of the country's Greek minority of spying for Greece, sentencing them to between six and eight years.

Greece reacted swiftly by recalling its ambassador from Albania, tightening the screw on already strained bilateral relations.

"Albanian leaders have completed today a serious provocation against international law, against human rights... and against Greece," said government spokesman Evangelos Venizelos in Athens in reference to the verdict.

The five were convicted of "collaborating with Greek secret services to arm the Greek minority in Albania" by smuggling 600 hunting rifles into Albania with the help of the Greek intelligence service.

They were also accused of informing Greek intelligence of Albanian troop movements.

Passing sentence, Judge Martin Deda said the court had sufficient proof of "ties between the accused...and the Greek secret services and other institutions."

The five were arrested on April 18 after an attack on a barracks in southern Albania, which has a Greek minority of 57,000 according to Tirana and 400,000 according to Athens.

The maximum sentence in Albania for spying is capital punishment but the public prosecutor said the law dated from the communist era and was not "in accordance with international laws."

Two of the accused, Panajot Marto and Vangel Papakristo, were given six-year jail terms, while their colleague Theodori Bozhani was sentenced to seven years, and co-defendents Irakli Sirmo and Kostandin Kyriakou to eight years each.

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The trial of the five, which began mid-August, has exacerbated already tense relations between Tirana and Athens. [passage omitted]

Tension also rose a notch further Wednesday in Greece after Albania expelled four Greek journalists. Venizelos condemned the move saying Albania had "flagrantly violated the freedom of the press" in an attempt to "limit the publicity" around the trial.

Greek Foreign Minister Carolos Papoulias will send a letter of protest to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and will refer to the trial at an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers Saturday in Germany, the spokesman said.

Latest Deportation Figure

AU0709091694 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 6 Sep 94

[Text] Public Order Ministry Spokesman Ludmilla Pajo reports that the total number of emigrants deported from Greece up to today totals 44,599. The influx of Albanians deported by the Greek police and Army is increasing considerably.

As of 1930 [1730 GMT] today, a total of 2,235 emigrants have been deported, with 1,262 deported from Kapshtice and 850 from Kakavije. The number of deportees via Sarande is increasing continually. Reports confirm that 23 were deported today, 12 of whom had passports with valid visas, which in most cases were torn to pieces by the Greek police.

We will inform you of further deportations in our later newscasts.

Diplomatic Relations With Azerbaijan Established

AU0809080794 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] Proceeding from the desire to strengthen friendship and bilateral cooperation, the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Azerbaijan agreed to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.

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Berov Addresses Assembly About Resignation

AU0709143094 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1317 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Address by Bulgarian Prime Minister Lyuben Berov at the National Assembly session in Sofia—live]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, people's representatives,

I have always valued the time of the National Assembly and therefore now I will again be brief—I will speak for no more than 10 minutes. I think that this is necessary.

You all know that on 2 September in the afternoon at a closed meeting the cabinet unanimously decided to resign because the mandate to rule until September, given to it by the parliament on 26 May through a vote of confidence, expired. On the following day I suppose you heard my speech on that occasion, which I read on the radio and television. As a matter of principle I will not repeat what I said in that speech.

By way of saying goodbye I propose to talk sincerely and calmly about certain painful problems of our time. I believe that despite the political passions, we as a nation, or at least as a parliament, did not completely lose our ability to listen prudently to each other on the general problems, despite the fact that we have different positions, and sometimes we do not have a mutual political sympathy for each other. This is an issue of elementary political culture. Let us, as a European state, demonstrate that we have such a culture, at least at this moment.

The first issue I want briefly to pose is the balance of the almost two-year activity of my cabinet since the end of 1992. This was a non-party cabinet of experts, without homosexuals and alcoholics. I know that within the framework of the balance some of you will say that the country is now in a swamp, a chaos, and so forth. Nevertheless, if we look back at the difficult way we passed, most of you would agree that within 20 months this cabinet successfully or partly successfully resolved conflicts which constantly emerged between various social strata, branches, professions, political parties, and so forth. It succeeded in preserving the country's political-economic equilibrium and ensuring a relatively calm period of development, without any major strikes or violations of the public order.

As a result of this, in the last three months the Bulgarian economy clearly shows signs of raising itself from the bottom of the economic crisis. It is the beginning of a moderate economic reanimation. This cabinet succeeded in signing an agreement with the London Club on settling the Bulgarian foreign debt problem, returned most of the land, resolved the problem of the so-called bad credits of the state enterprises from the period before 1990, and so forth. The cabinet inevitably was subjected to negative criticism because of its anti-inflation policy, which nevertheless produced results and sustained the pressure of uncontrollable inflation.

Of course, as every human enterprise, this cabinet had its shortcomings, which did not allow it to achieve better results.

All this was achieved without sufficient parliamentary support within the framework of the so-called dynamic parliamentary majority. Occasionally, this was a rather insecure squeaking majority of 130-150 deputies from three parliamentary factions. It did not control the parliament, because the National Assembly chairman was from the opposition, and so were the chairmen of many parliamentary commissions. Therefore, the parliament was late in adopting laws which were needed by the government, and it failed to adopt other laws before the summer vacation. Thus the cabinet could not work normally in a period of reforms, which required new laws, against the background of a parliament in which opposition and government were not clearly outlined.

The second issue I would like to pose refers to the political crisis in the country. You remember well that this nonparty cabinet was elected at a time of a sharp political crisis, when a strong confrontation between the country's basic political forces existed and there was a confrontation also in the parliament. At that time there was no other solution than forming such a nonparty cabinet. At that time a purely blue [Union of Democratic Forces—SDS] or red [Bulgarian Socialist Party—BSP] government threatened to violate the peace in the country. This cabinet failed to eliminate the confrontation. Recently the confrontation even developed in the parliament into a boycott of some of its sessions on the part of the SDS parliamentary faction. However, this did not reflect the situation among the simple people of our nation. At that mass level I can say that the confrontation recently abated, and this was to a certain degree the result of the moderate image and activity of this cabinet. It is possible to hold elections in such a situation.

Another problem of our internal political development, which could not be ignored, is the problem of our political behavior and culture. Of course, there is an opposition in all democratic states. An ostensible unity of thought exists only in dictatorships. However, the style of the opposition's activity is significant. This is the style of the country's political life, which is observed by foreign countries. It determines to a certain degree the image and the authority of our country abroad. The present level of the political culture in our country very negatively influences the willingness of the people to serve the country when it requires it.

The last pearl of our political mentality belongs to the trade union leader Mr. Trenchev, who in connection with the resignation of the cabinet declared that a gang of bandits is leaving. Unfortunately, they are leaving without the sticks, which he promised some time ago would dance on their backs. Well, against the background of such a mentality you, the parliament, will have increasing difficulties to find decent people who could head the state institutions, and at the same time suffer

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insults and abuse, and receive a salary that is smaller than the salary of the manager of a small private bank. I understand the difficult situation in which Mr. Trenchev finds himself as a trade union general of an army which is becoming smaller and smaller. Furthermore, all his close aides have left him. Against the background of such a situation obviously it is necessary to make noise and simulate a certain activity and power.

I and my colleagues could tolerate this insult without any problem if it came from a pure man. But this is a different case. I propose that Mr. Trenchev, as a person who is familiar with the technological restructuring of our industrial enterprises, the establishment of [two words indistinct], and the ostensibly large debts Germany owes Bulgaria since 1944, and so forth, be elected prime minister. I believe that thus, he will engage in some useful activity and tranquility will reign. Unfortunately, Mr. Trenchev is only an example, but not an exception.

Please allow me to give you a piece of advice, despite the fact that for some deputies I am a thorn in the eye. After two years, during which because of you I carried a crown of thorns on my head, I think that I have the right to give you some advice.

I think that the attempts of certain politicians and institutions to patch up a new cabinet within the framework of this parliament are harmful and dangerous for the country. I understand the soul of many deputies, who would like to remain members of the parliament. However, such a coalition cabinet patched up by only a part of the right or the left part of the parliament, will not be able to withstand the pressure and be a government of national consensus. It will not withstand the fire on which we were fried for two years, and this without having any party differences among ourselves. Such a cabinet will have such differences. It will only continue and strengthen the political crisis in Bulgaria without being able to resolve the difficult problems we meet daily, even when we understand that the transition toward a new social system cannot be effected in a rapid and painless manner.

This is my advice: Let the president form within a brief period of time a nonparty, uncommitted, caretaker cabinet, and let us have elections as soon as possible. Let us prior to those elections talk to the people about the aforementioned acute problems of our economic and social policy, rather than engage in general tales about the victory of some blue, red, or green idea.

Finally, I propose that until the parliament resolves the current political crisis and as long as this cabinet is in charge of current state policy, to authorize us to conduct talks with the IMF and complete the talks with Russia on transit gas pipelines, the supply of oil, supplies for the army, and so forth.

I propose to postpone all steps related to mass privatization until a new cabinet is in place after the elections. I propose to accept the resignation of my government through an open vote and as soon as possible. Thank you for your attention. [applause]

Zhelev, BZNS Support Early Elections

AU0709152794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] President Zhelev and representatives of the Anastasiya Mozer-led Bulgarian Agrarian National Union [BZNS] Permanent Board discussed issues of the agrarian reform. The political situation in the country against the background of the resignation of Professor Berov's cabinet was also discussed.

The Agrarians again expressed their position that, since the day it was formed, this cabinet has demonstrated that it is incapable of resolving the three most important problems of the country: stopping crime, implementing agrarian reform, and intensifying mass privatization.

According to the BZNS representatives, no government within the framework of the existing parliament could resolve those problems, and the only solution is to hold early parliamentary elections.

President Zhelyu Zhelev stated that his position on the issue of early parliamentary elections has not changed—and that he also thinks that Bulgaria needs elections as soon as possible.

New General Staff Chief Totomirov Profiled

AU0809102694 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 5 Sep 94 p 1

[Report by BULGARSKA ARMIYA correspondent]

[Text] Colonel General Engineer Tsvetan Mladenov Totomirov was born on 14 April 1943 in the village of Rebrovo, Montana Oblast. He is married and has two children.

Colonel General Totomirov has completed the Vasil Levski Higher Military School's five-year course—1961-66, the Georgi Sava Rakovski Military Academy's three year course—1972-75, and has studied at the General Staff Military Academy in Moscow—1984-86.

He was the commander of a motorized riflemen platoon, a motorized riflemen company, a motorized riflemen batallion, and a motorized riflemen regiment, as well as the deputy commander of a motorized riflemen division, the commander of a division, the deputy commander of the 3d Army, the commander of the 3d Army, the deputy head of the Georgi Rakovski Military Academy, and the commander of the Ground Troops.

Newspaper Views Alternative Solutions to Crisis

AU0709201094 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 5 Sep 94 p 4

[Rumyana Bratovanova commentary: "The Time Came for Politicians To Wipe Stigma From Their Faces"]

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[Text] Berov beat all those who claimed his head—he chose to go in the English manner. He decided to renounce power without delay, and now along with the entire country he will watch a show: how the small parties are prepared to cut throats in order to gain power, while the leading parties refuse to assume responsibility for the dish they have cooked up over the last five years. New elections or a new cabinet based on a preliminary political agreement in the existing parliament—those are the only more or less stable solutions at present. However, both are difficult if not impossible. Many deputies reject the elections variant—the most prominent among them and their number—are well-known. Besides, there are no funds for new elections. The prospect of holding elections early in the winter, being aware that about half of the voters will not participate in the elections because of the great winter cold, turns this ideal solution to the crisis into an inefficient one. Whenever we talk about new elections we must keep the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] in mind. Both have serious internal problems that will not be resolved in time for new elections.

A political agreement by the parliamentary forces on supporting a new expert cabinet appears to be an almost fantastic solution at this stage. Great layers of mistrust and hatred have accumulated between the BSP and the SDS. The two young political leaders would lose their political credibility. They cannot make an about-face now because Filip Dimitrov—over the last two years—and Zhan Videnov—over the last six months—have constantly talked about new elections. It appears that even at the apex of the confrontation it was easier for Filip Dimitrov to sign an agreement with Aleksandur Lilov, rather than with the much less discredited Zhan Videnov. If we are to be objective we must admit that the SDS is more interested in such an agreement, because in the last two years it has become aware of the absurdity of controlling the reins of power and boycotting it at the same time. The upcoming period will be an exceptional one, and it will last until the turn of the century. Elections are coming, one way or another, and who is to control (or rather, manipulate) them is important. In addition, privatization is already unavoidable and no responsible political force could afford to shun this process, because aside from its corporation and political interests it also has obligations to the voters who support it. It would be insane to leave the remaining national wealth in the hands of the BSP because it is clear that if a new cabinet is formed according to the formula of Professor Berov's cabinet, it will be dominated by the Socialists, the Mafia, or their offspring. Will Filip Dimitrov be sufficiently responsible not only to the SDS cause but also to national interests? The psychological characteristics of his personality and the advisers around him make this question redundant.

Since the two logical solutions to the crisis appear to be implausible, there remains a third—a new cabinet structure consisting of deputies who have been expelled from their former parties, and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS]. God help us and this cabinet if it is formed. No guarantees are capable of blocking the shady and overt economic groups that will continue to freely play their game, whose final goal is the division of the remaining national wealth. The simple citizens will remain poop and insignificant symbols on whom nothing will depend in the next 50 years, precisely the same situation as the last 50 years. Such a cabinet would most probably be a leftist one and controlled by the BSP, which is the strongest faction in the parliament. There is sufficient evidence showing that tireless politicians of the type of Ludzhev, Tomov, and Pushkarov, will invest a lot of effort in this variant. The mergers developed over the vacation period already, and this week the formation of a new parliamentary faction is expected. It will consist of Tomov and Pushkarov's people. They were already in power one, and to a large extent they never left it, because fate was good to them, and because they succeeded in avoiding great political calamities. The fact that none of them ever succeeded in achieving anything important has already been forgotten, as is always the case in our country.

There is yet another solution, which has greater political potential. It involves authoritative SDS deputies risking their political future for the brief period during which they are in power, which will be a fateful time in our country's history. Aleksandur Dzherov, Georgi Markov, and Stefan Savov could be a consoling alternative, if they are given the time to form an anticommunist parliamentary majority. Without such a majority any enterprise would be pure adventure.

The most plausible solution is the formation of a cabinet of expelled former SDS, BSP, and DPS members, with the support of the president. Such a cabinet would be formed with great difficulty after painful haggling, but this is logical. A majority of the weak always has more difficulty than a single powerful majority. This compromise will have grave consequences for the political structure of frail pluralism, because the blend will destroy the character of the few parliamentary forces that still preserve their own image. This new cabinet would deprive the BSP of many members (members of the Alliance for Social Democracy plus candidate-pensioners), and there would be a new SDS split. It will not have a clear ideology and program and will have no responsibility.

The present moment is not only critical but also fateful for the country, because stopping the reforms for two years has brought the people to extreme poverty and helplessness against the Mafia onslaught. Now is the time for our politicians to wipe the stigma from their brows, forget their personal interests, and do something to stop the disintegration of the country, something for which they are responsible.

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SDS Commission Submits Coalition Agreement

AU0809100094 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 2 Sep 94 pp 1,2

["Final Version" of Draft on Political Agreement of Union of Democratic Forces Member Parties]

[Text] A special commission, elected by the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] National Coordinating Council in charge of drafting the political agreement of the SDS member parties and organizations, submitted the aforementioned document yesterday. The National Coordinating Council session thoroughly discussed the draft at a session held on Wednesday [31 August] reaching a consensus on its contents.

After the debates on the document and its final adoption, the signing of the political agreement by the SDS member parties and organizations is expected to take place on 6 September 1994—a date marking the anniversary of Bulgaria's unification.

We publish herewith the full text of the agreement:

Guided by the awareness that Bulgaria is in the throes of a grave political, economic, and moral crisis,

realizing that the current parliament has totally exhausted its possibilities as a supreme legislative organ and has ceased to enjoy the Bulgarian voters' confidence,

realizing that the major institutions of the state are hopelessly discredited and that the very idea of democracy is in jeopardy'

realizing that the present cabinet, supported by the Communists and their satellites, has repeatedly encroached upon the country's Constitution, has failed to fulfill the commitments it assumed on the basis of the government program, and is conducting a policy to the detriment of Bulgaria's future,

realizing that the political landscape in Bulgaria has been totally reshaped without holding new elections by betraying the constituents' vote and introducing overall re-communization, which resulted in the former Communist Party taking over all spheres of power,

realizing that the survival of the Bulgarian nation is at stake and that early parliamentary elections are the only real solution for the current critical situation,

realizing that the SDS continues to be the only real alternative for democratic changes, for establishing a modern market economy, and for our country's integration with the developed European states,

and taking into account the fact

that several changes have occurred in the composition of the SDS coalition since the signing of the political agreement in September 1991,

realizing that the last agreement played a positive role for the consolidation of the SDS member parties and organizations until the present moment,

realizing a new political situation has emerged in the country related to the desire of certain political forces to postpone the holding of early parliamentary elections,

the parties and organizations represented in the SDS have agreed on the following:

1. The SDS shall participate in the forthcoming parliamentary elections as a national movement of parties, organizations, and citizens rallied in the SDS political coalition, which has been agreed upon and is based on its current statute.

2. It is the definite goal of the SDS to win the forthcoming parliamentary elections and to form its own cabinet, assuming sole responsibility for the country's government. The SDS is ready to form a coalition with the other anti-communist, democratic, parliamentary forces. Under no circumstances whatsoever is the SDS willing to cooperate with the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and its satellites in any form of coalition whatsoever.

3. In assuming an unequivocal commitment to its members and to the entire Bulgarian people the SDS participates in the forthcoming parliamentary elections with a uniform program whose basic principles are related to the following objectives:

—A genuine reform of the economic system through restitution and privatization of state property whose mass character and form of market economy shall be implemented solely in the interest of all Bulgarian citizens;

—the country's financial and economic stabilization, based on market economy relations, on real economic measures aimed at curbing inflation and halting the devaluation of the national currency, as well as at protecting the Bulgarian citizens' savings;

—the final restitution of the land to its owners within the real boundaries, effective assistance for the agricultural sector, tax exemptions, and convenient credits for commodity producers, as well as guarantees for the marketing of their goods;

—providing favorable legislative conditions for the development of small and medium-sized businesses for the establishment and consolidation of a middle class in Bulgaria and for providing employment for Bulgarian citizens, especially for young people for whose benefit special programs should be drafted with the purpose of stimulating their professional development;

—adopting real measures against the Bulgarian citizens' further impoverishment and to assist unemployed citizens, pensioners, and underprivileged groups by restoring the social welfare funds;

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—waging an uncompromising struggle against corruption, against unrestrained crime, against the violation of the Bulgarian citizens' human rights and property, against the robbing of state property;

—drafting a clear concept on national security, establishing a strong and professionally trained Army, highly qualified and well provided for police forces, capable of successfully combating organized crime, mafias, and corruption;

—conducting an independent foreign policy, subject solely to the country's interest and likely to secure our integration with the European structures and with NATO, as well as protecting the interests of Bulgarians living abroad;

—guaranteeing the legal rights of all Bulgarian citizens and preventing ethnic conflicts;

—supporting the unification of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and guaranteeing the religious freedom of every Bulgarian citizen;

—providing favorable legislative conditions and tax alleviations to the benefit of education, science, and culture, as well as for the development of mass and professional sports;

—immediately rescinding all re-communization and anti- democratic laws.

4. The National Conference and the National Coordinating Council are the supreme leading organs of the SDS coalition. Their decisions are binding for each member party and organization of the coalition, for all local and regional SDS structures, for the SDS National Assembly deputies and for the SDS Parliamentary Group as a whole.

5. The SDS participates in the forthcoming elections with a uniform list of candidates for National Assembly seats. The SDS is represented in the National Assembly by one parliamentary group, namely by the SDS Parliamentary Group. The SDS member parties and organizations are called upon to draft a detailed mechanism for nominating candidates for seats in the institutions of legislative and executive power. The mechanism demands that the local structures should propose the candidates, that the national leaderships of the SDS member parties and organizations should provide the guarantees for their candidates and that the nominees should be approved by the National Coordinating Council in conformity with the decisions of the Fifth and Sixth SDS national conferences. For this purpose the SDS National Coordinating Council is drafting an appropriate mechanism on nominations, which should also apply to non-party members, guaranteeing their eligibility and the loyalty of the already elected National Assembly deputies regarding the will of their constituents.

6. The SDS member parties and organizations whose representatives have signed the agreement should commit themselves under no circumstances to support and to participate in the formation of a new cabinet within the framework of the 36th National Assembly, considering that such an act would be disastrous for Bulgaria.

7. Each of the member parties and organizations that have signed the agreement are entitled voluntarily to withdraw their signature, which signifies that they are leaving the SDS coalition.

The violation of the aforementioned political agreement by any of the signatory parties and organizations is a reason for starting the procedure of expelling the relevant party or organization in accordance with Article 6 of the SDS Statute.

8. The parties and organizations that signed the present political agreement declare that their political agreement of September 1991 has expired. By signing the new document the member parties and organizations are expressing their readiness for joint political actions within the framework of the SDS coalition.

9. The present political agreement is open to everyone who is willing to join it, after observing the procedures stemming from Article 2 and on the basis of the SDS Statute.

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Supreme Court Quashes Verdict Against Minarek

AU0709211894 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 1 Sep 94 p 16

[Article by "js, CTK": "Supreme Court Quashes Verdict Against Intelligence Officer Pavel Minarik"]

[Text] At a closed meeting in Prague yesterday, the Supreme Court fully quashed the verdict of the Prague City Court, under which former Czechoslovak intelligence officer Pavel Minarik was sentenced to four years in prison for having prepared a bomb attack against Radio Free Europe in Munich. The Supreme Court returned the matter to the State Attorney for investigation. This was announced by Vladimir Vocka, chairman of the Supreme Court Tribunal of Judges. The Supreme Court dealt with the case on the basis of Minarik's appeal against the Prague City Court's verdict of September 1993. The City Court sentenced Minarik for having prepared, in the first half of the 1970's, and having repeatedly submitted to the Ministry of Interior proposals on how to put Radio Free Europe out of operation by means of an explosion. According to the City Court, he thereby committed the criminal act of public endangerment. Vocka did not say what caused the Supreme Court to quash the verdict, on the grounds that the parties involved must first be familiarized with the reasons for the ruling.

[Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 2 September on page 4 carries a 400-word "js"-signed report entitled "Objections of Principle." The report quotes Vladimir Vocka as having told a LIDOVE NOVINY reporter that "the verdict was quashed because of violation of provisions of the Penal Code, on the basis of four of the six letters of first section of Article 258 of the Penal Code." The LIDOVE NOVINY reporter explains that reasons cited in this section of Article 258 include "substantial shortcomings in the proceedings preceding the verdict," "unclear or incomplete establishment of facts," the court's failure to "consider all significant circumstances," or "doubts about the correctness of the established facts."]

ΩMilitary Training Developments Updated

94P21164A

[Editorial Report]

Cooperation With Foreign Forces

Czech press articles have reported numerous recent instances of joint training operations and other forms of cooperation between the Czech Army and the forces of various NATO and other European countries:

—Members of the French 92d Infantry Regiment and the Czech 23d Mechanized Battalion recently participated in a 14-day training exercise at the Boletice Training Area near Cesky Krumlov. These French soldiers were the first foreign troops to bring their own weapons with them to the Czech Republic for a training exercise. The purpose of the exercise was to test compatibility of tactical commands and mutual use of weapons. It is also reported that a Czech unit (the 1st Company of the Strasice Battalion) has just returned from France after a similar exercise there. (ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY, 10 June)

—Czech air-defense units from the 41st and 42d Antiaircraft Missile Brigade conducted joint training operations with Polish forces at the Ustka training area in Poland. Using Polish support equipment (radar, transporters, and launchers), the Czech troops fired Czech antiaircraft missiles at targets launched from Polish naval vessels. Czech Major General Jiri Nekvasil and the Polish Army chief of staff, Tadeas Wilecki, personally congratulated the gunners on their perfect score of eight hits out of eight missiles fired. (A REPORT, 31 May)

—Discussions are currently under way with the Bundeswehr inspector general about possible joint training for the Czech and German Armies. U.S. units in Germany have reportedly expressed interest in participation in such exercises. (A REPORT, 31 May)

—The Czech Army is planning to participate along with units from eight NATO nations in a joint small-unit peacekeeping exercise in the second half of 1994. The Netherlands has offered to host the training exercise. (A REPORT, 31 May)

—Czech Army personnel are being trained in the Internet communications protocol, which, among other things, will enable them to communicate with NATO headquarters as well as with the Pentagon. (A REPORT, 31 May)

—Observers from foreign armies were admitted to a brigade command staff exercise conducted by the Command and Staff College of the Military Academy in Brno for its graduating class. The theme of the exercise was planning, organization, and maneuvering for a mechanized brigade mission in the event of a military threat to the Czech Republic. The dean of the college, Colonel Arnost Vrany, briefed representatives of the German Bundeswehr Command Academy, the Austrian Land Defense Academy, and the Dutch Institute of Defense Studies on the exercise and gave them a tour of the college's facilities. (A REPORT, 28 June)

—A six-member delegation from the German Ground Forces' Officer School visited the Czech Ground Forces' Military School in Vyskov, where Army officers are trained in logistics. (A REPORT, 12 July)

Rapid-Deployment Unit Trains

The new Czech Army rapid-deployment brigade, which is being organized to give the Czech military the capability of participating in international peacekeeping operations, officially began its training on 30 June, with a demonstration of karate, a 16-man parachute jump

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from a helicopter, and a parade. At present, the brigade has 69 percent of its authorized strength. Another 14 percent should soon be filled by new military school and university graduates. According to the Mechanized Corps Command, the current combat readiness of the brigade is 25 percent, but it should reach 50 percent by the end of the of the year and 100 percent in June 1995. Currently, the best trained unit is the 43d Chrudim Mechanized Airborne Brigade.

As soldiers arrive for service in the brigade, they are generally assigned to the best units and then gradually reassigned to lower levels, if they do not meet the physical requirements, and eventually removed if they are deemed unqualified. Brigade members have been issued so-called jungle-camouflage uniforms and green berets, with the exception of the brigade's airborne units, which were authorized to retain their red berets. (A REPORT, 12 July)

Army Reserve Strength

In response to a question about the current strength of the Czech Army's reserve forces, Czech Defense Ministry press spokeman Zdenek Borkovec replied that a soldier can remain effective for only about five years after the completion of his active duty service or his last training exercise and that the Czech Army currently has 300,000 to 350,000 such individuals on its rosters. However, Borkovec added that, because of limited funds, only about 10,000 reservists are expected to be called to active duty for training in 1994. Those who were in service or training in 1992 or 1993 will not be included. (ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY, 23 May)

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Kovac Addresses Nation on Election Campaign Eve

LD0709124894 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1805 GMT 6 Sep 94

[Address to the nation by President Michal Kovac on the occasion of the official start of the parliamentary election campaign—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] An early election is usually a result of internal political instability and is a response to a political crisis. This was the case with our early election, too. It is certainly better to put an end to a crisis period by calling an early election than to prolong the crisis. [passage omitted]

I do not think the election will resolve the problem of the inadequate internal stability of our political parties and movements, but, because we will have an opportunity to chose between them through the election, we should be able to quite significantly influence our state's internal political stability as well. [passage omitted]

I think that, in the forthcoming election, we will decide above all whether to embark on the path of tough political confrontation or the path of national, civil, and political reconciliation; whether we nourish mutual respect and tolerance or whether some will intimidate others; whether we will ignore each other and keep apart or whether we will cooperate in harmony and respect equal rights for all, irrespective of religious, national, or political allegiance or whether somebody belongs to the majority or not. We will also decide whether to rely on our own qualities and abilities, whether to follow the path of involving thousands and hundreds of thousands of able people in solving our problems through democratic means, or whether we want to expect that all of our problems will be solved on our behalf by able individuals or a tough government. [passage omitted]

I feel it is my duty to appeal to the leaders of political parties and movements, the leaders of the individual regions, and to the candidates in the election: Do not allow yourself to be carried away by emotions and hatred. Correct competition and calm persuasion will bring better results than accusations and slandering rivals. The election campaign must not turn into a life-or-death struggle, where the sole aim is the moral and political destruction of opponents. Let us remember that, even after the election, life must go on and that even after the election we will meet and cooperate with those whom we might have unnecessarily insulted. [passage omitted]

Esteemed citizens! I would like to appeal to you to respect the results of the election even if your party or movement does not win or does not achieve the results you hoped for. In a democratic system, the minority must accept the majority view and respect it. In some future elections, the losers now may be the winners, and it is therefore proper and correct that they respect each other.

Daily: President Should Resign If Meciar Wins

AU0809111094

[Editorial Report] Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 3 September devotes its entire pages 6 and 7 to material about President Michal Kovac. The material, which is published under the headline "That Can Be...and That Can Also Be," consists of a 1,200-word annotated biography of Kovac by SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA Chief Editor Jan Smolec, a selection of readers' letters criticizing the president's statements and actions, and extensive excerpts from Kovac's newspaper interviews, in which Kovac's favorable comments about Vladimir Meciar before Kovac's election as president are juxtaposed with his criticism of Meciar after his election.

In his annotated Kovac biography, Smolec stresses Kovac's stay in Havana in 1964-65 "to train Fidel Castro's bankers" and challenges Kovac's claims about his professional degradation in the wake of his expulsion from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1970, pointing out that, "in the years of rigid normalization, he had built himself a luxurious mansion." Smolec also pays attention to linguistic mistakes allegedly made by Kovac in his speeches, giving examples of his "transgressions against the Slovak language" and of Kovac's repeated use of the East Slovak dialect, even in official speeches. In an apparent attempt to illustrate the president's poor command of his native tongue, even the headline of the SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA feature ("That Can Be...and That Can Also Be") is rendered in the East Slovak dialect ("I Tak Se Da...I Tak Se Da"). According to Smolec, the president's use of nonliterary Slovak "is Michal Kovac's particularly weak spot and should be analyzed by experts." Smolec labels Kovac as "successor to Vasil Bilak," the former chief ideologue of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia who is of Ukrainian descent and had often been ridiculed because of his poor Slovak, and voices the hope that "command of the Slovak language will be taken into consideration when selecting the third Slovak president."

Speaking about Kovac's post-1989 career, Smolec recalls his own encounters with the present president before the 1992 election, when they both were Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) deputies in the Federal Assembly in Prague. Smolec recalls Michal Kovac as a "lukewarm patriot" who "wanted to arrive at Slovak statehood cautiously" and who, unlike the "nationally oriented" HZDS deputies, "did not actively enforce" the idea of establishing the post of Slovak president at that time.

Smolec's biography is followed by the following passage: "The second Slovak president has been a failure. We all who supported him to a greater or lesser degree bear responsibility for it. However, man is not clairvoyant to be able to predict how a presidential candidate later turns out in the post of president. Initially, Michal Kovac vehemently supported Vladimir Meciar. Wherever he went, he praised Meciar. When he became president, he

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made an about-face, forgetting that, had it not been for Meciar, he would never have become president.

"In the post of president, he revealed his true self. He initiated and organized the dismissal of a democratically elected government. He ceased respecting the Constitution, and there was a threat that he would introduce presidential dictatorship. He appropriated powers that do not belong to him. He refused to appoint a member of the government [Vladimir Lexa] proposed by the prime minister. He held the prime minister accountable for executive power but appropriated the power to decide on the government's composition, despite the fact that, under the Constitution, the government is answerable for the execution of its functions to the National Council of the Slovak Republic. In an outright provocative manner, he supported politicians who had voted against sovereignty.

"The president managed to influence parliament but, at the same time, suffered a massive loss of citizens' trust. The president proposes, the citizen disposes. Citizens are able to compare and judge how politicians behave in front of television cameras, for example, how they react to questions, whether their answers contain arguments or cliches and platitudes. It suffices to recall his appearances in the 'May I Have a Word With You, Mr. President' programs. The programs broadcast thus far have confirmed that, in office, the president is mostly guided by the principle 'that can be...and that can also be....' The only time the president acted in a principled way was in liquidating Meciar.

"However, he has not succeeded in sweeping Meciar away from the Slovak political scene. Meciar will win the election. What conclusions will the president draw from this will of the people? He will have to charge a man, about whom he speaks only negatively, with forming a new government. If he decides to do so, he will lose moral authority in the eyes of citizens. If Meciar wins the election, the president will lose his unfair power game. Such failures are not tolerated in politics. In such a case, sensible politicians leave on their own...."

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Report on Goncz-Demirel News Conference

LD0709174994 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Excerpt] A $64 million deal on power plants, a friendship treaty, and flourishing relations are the key terms of Turkish President Suleyman Demirel's visit to Hungary. Miklos Lengyel reports from the international news conference held by Hungarian President Arpad Goncz and the Turkish president.

[Lengyel] Hungary and Turkey are both European countries and both countries are located at the edge of the Balkans, so we have a lot of common interests. This was said by the Turkish president at the international news conference held jointly with Arpad Goncz. Prior to this, they signed the Hungarian-Turkish agreement on friendship and cooperation.

I asked the Turkish president at the press briefing, how he assessed the Balkan crisis. Relations between Albania and Greece are tense at the moment—Greece and Serbia are in rather close cooperation, while Turkey has a defense agreement with Albania. Is it not possible that a kind of military conflict could develop from this situation, particularly since tension is not easing in Bosnia- Herzegovina? Suleyman Demirel's answer was as follows:

[Begin Demirel recording in Turkish, with superimposed translation into Hungarian] There is, indeed, a defense agreement between Turkey and Albania, but this is aimed primarily at military training. This agreement is aimed at cooperation between the two countries and by no means threatens the security of a third country.

As far as Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, well, the situation there is very tense indeed. We have to do everything possible in order to eliminate this hotbed of war [end recording]

[Lengyel] In connection with this, Arpad Goncz said the following:

[Begin Goncz recording] If there is one country which cannot afford for its soldiers even to take one step on the soil of this region, this country is Hungary.

Two wars broke out as a result of Hungary and her allies entering the territory of Serbia. We, together with the other countries, are in the embargo against Serbia, and we are keeping to this. As far as we can manage, we are doing everything so that humanitarian aid consignments should reach that area. We ourselves provide humanitarian aid and are trying to give a home to the rather large number of Yugoslav refugees staying in our country. [end recording]

Defense Chief on Current Tasks, Situation

LD0709220694 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Excerpts] It is almost certain that the Defense Ministry and the general headquarters of the Hungarian Army will not be merged. Although the government is to debate the question tomorrow, it is expected that the January decree of the former government will be annulled. This was said at the meeting of the Defense Committee, where six military attaches were introduced; the committee supported their appointment. After this the defense minister gave a briefing. Erno Peter Kiss reports:

[Kiss] There has not been and there is not any political cleansing in the Defense Ministry, the minister said at the beginning of his briefing, referring to the fact that one of the deputies accused the new military leadership of this the other day. Gyorgy Keleti told the parliament's Defense Committee that six high- ranking officers have been relieved, and some of them are to carry on in active service.

The minister emphasized that the leading post of the military security office is a confidential task and the former commander did not enjoy the minister's confidence. Earlier on, the general had ordered personnel and security investigations, the nature of which, according to Minister Keleti, were incompatible with the tasks of the military security office.

Talking about the situation of the Hungarian Army, the defense minister said that it is necessary to initiate the professional and organizational transformation of the army. Military-diplomatic ties with NATO and neighboring countries must be strengthened, and new budget and economic management guidelines must be worked out. [passage omitted]

The Defense Committee proposed to the minister that it would be expedient if representatives of the ministry consulted the committee before they gave public statements on vital issues.

Trade Union Leader Views Interest Coordination

AU0209132494 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 30 Aug 94 p 3

[Interview with Sandor Nagy, chairman of the National Federation of Trade Unions in Hungary, by Judit O-Varga; place and dated not given: "The MSZOSZ Has Never Shadowboxed"]

[Text] *Sandor Nagy, chairman of the National Federation of Trade Unions in Hungary [MSZOSZ], expects tough debates in connection with the supplementary budget. He said that it is their conscious policy not to push the other confederations into the background.*

[O-Varga] Gyula Horn started his visit to you by stating that he would like to rely on the trade unions. Does this kind of relationship carry any dangers?

[Nagy] It could be misleading to state that we rely on the government. For us, it would be distinctly unfortunate. What the MSZOSZ is interested in is that the government, despite the difficulties, takes the employees and pensioners into consideration and includes the social

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partners in preparing its decisions. I do not even know how the government could rely on us; it is certain that it considers the trade unions important in revealing the problems.

[O-Varga] Are you satisfied with the government's activities so far?

[Nagy] Compared to the past, it is something new that the government program has a separate chapter on interest coordination. It is definitely a positive factor, and so is the fact that one of the first actions of the new prime minister and the labor minister was to ask the employers and employees for coordination in the Interest Coordination Council. It is satisfying that Horn visited the country's biggest trade union within the first 40 days of his office. Naturally, we have also had problems. For example, the fact that the government had already decided the actual figures made it pointless for the government, employers, and trade unions to discuss the guidelines of the supplementary budget.

It is clear that this government wants dialogue. Of course it will not be easy. We can look forward to two months of intensive talks. The government can only implement its decision on having dialogue if it is determined to do so.

[O-Varga] The supplementary budget for 1994 is being discussed separately from the four-year agreement. Could this endanger the the planned long-term agreement?

[Nagy] The 1994 restrictive measures—on which a tough debate is expected—do not mean an independent economic line. These measures obviously cannot expect trade union support.

[O-Varga] Can an agreement be achieved that way?

[Nagy] The supplementary budget does not necessarily belong in that category.

[O-Varga] We have already seen the first conflict within the trade union side on the level of real wages. The interpretation of the chairman of the Workers' Councils was that you wanted to deter the trade union federations from their original demands. Do you expect tensions between the trade unions?

[Nagy] We did not have a clash of views, you need to have views to do this. It is our joint demand that real wages must not be reduced. However, none of the federations have suggested anything more on this issue. This is one of the reasons why I suggested at the coordination meeting that we should clarify our demands. The original half-sentence is not enough for a professional debate.

[O-Varga] As a result of the elections to the social insurance administration, the employee side of the Interest Coordination Council, the balance of the six trade unions participating in it has changed to the benefit of the MSZOSZ. As a result, can we expect changes in the attitude of the MSZOSZ?

[Nagy] The MSZOSZ cannot be accused of pushing the other trade unions into the background because of its more than 50 percent result. We have done nothing that would have pushed the other confederations into the background. This is the result of our conscious policy. It is expedient for all trade unions to be dealing with interest protection rather than each other.

[O-Varga] Some people object that the MSZOSZ is not taking a firm stand against the restrictive measures of the supplementary budget.

[Nagy] We have never shadowboxed. We act on concrete facts when necessary; we do not attack plans. During the talks, we are seeking a solution that is still viable economically and still bearable socially.

Rival Hungarian Organizations in Transcarpathia

94CH0393A Uzhhorod IGAZ SZO in Hungarian 6 Aug 94 p 2

[Interview with Arpad Dalmay, cochairman of the Berehove Region Hungarian Federation, by Elemer Kovacs in Berehove; date not given: "Berehove Region Hungarian Federation Formed; KMKSZ Suspends Activities"]

[Text] The leaders of KMKSZ's [Cultural Association of Subcarpathian Hungarians] city basic organization had gathered with an entirely different purpose in mind: to tally the results of the local elections. Yet, this was not what attracted attention to its deliberations. For at the meeting it was decided that the district KMKSZ leadership would suspend its activities. The name of the new organization, which is based in Beregszasz [Berehove], is the Berehove Region Hungarian Federation [BMSZ]. Subsequently, the representatives of the 17 basic organizations present elected BMSZ's three-member executive board, which will run the affairs of the organization until the meeting of the delegates scheduled for 13 August.

After the meeting, we questioned one of the copresidents of the new organization, Arpad Dalmay.

[Kovacs] What, in fact, happened here?

[Dalmay] As it is well known, confrontations have become more and more characteristic of our relationship with the county leaders, and the problem became even more acute during the elections. I would like to stress that we are not talking only about personal conflicts. We have kept running up against the objective fact that the Hungarians of the Beregszasz region have interests that are in many instances different from those of the rest of the Hungarian community. For this reason we consider it to be our moral duty to take upon ourselves tasks which due to our unique situation, numerical ratio, and so forth, are of a different character. With the split announced here and the forming of this new organization we are trying to address this new requirement.

[Kovacs] What will be the result of this decision?

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[Dalmay] For all practical purposes the Beregszasz district KMKSZ will cease to exist. Naturally, our aim is to get the KMKSZ basic organizations operating in the villages of the district to join us, already under the new flag. Naturally, those who do not wish to leave will henceforth belong directly under the Ungvar [Uzhhorod] KMKSZ center. It is true that we want to become independent from the KMKSZ. However, we will continue to support every useful initiative, irrespective of whether it originates from the KMKSZ, or the MEKK [expansion unknown]. Soon we will draft our platform, and those who agree with our aspirations will be allowed to join us, whatever part of Subcarpathia they may be living in. Our key principles, by the way, were already the subjects of intense debate at the meeting that just adjourned.

[Kovacs] Are you talking about the action plan which the BMSZ's provisional board will be presenting to the participants at the meeting of delegates?

[Dalmay] The preliminary wording is as follows: "The BMSZ considers it to be one of its primary missions to support the social self-organization efforts of the local Hungarian community in the areas of training, education and culture. It wants to be more effective than was the KMKSZ in promoting our quest for autonomy. Its aim is to protect the interest of Hungarians, and to form and deepen ties with the local governments. It considers it important to work hard at getting people to join the BMSZ from villages located outside the district where the populace supports the idea of promoting the attainment of Hungarian autonomy."

[Kovacs] So it is the autonomy issue again....

[Dalmay] The new self-government law is already on the agenda of the new Ukrainian parliament. So the issue is still very timely.

[Kovacs] How complicated are the financial repercussions of the split?

[Dalmay] The county center has never been overly generous to us. So far we have had to rely mostly on our own resources anyway.

[Kovacs] Your immediate tasks?

[Dalmay] As we have already mentioned, the drafting of the new action plan; preparation for the meeting of delegates; and a membership drive. Soon we will publish a declaration that will explain the step we have just taken, and outline the most important challenges facing us in the immediate future. We realize that in these economically troubled times it will not be easy to shake people up again and to give them faith. I hope that more and more people will join us who are willing and able to help further the interests of the Hungarians living here. Otherwise, none of this would make any sense.

From the Editor

Just a reminder: It should also be pointed out in this connection that for years now, Hungarian residents of Szolyva [Ukrainian name unknown] have belonged to an independent organization, and that this spring, the Tecso [Tyachiv] city organization also suspended its participation in the KMKSZ. We have learned that the legally and officially registered Uzhhorod city chapter of the cultural federation, which has prepared a lengthy study analyzing the negative tendencies affecting the county leadership's work style, is considering to make a similar move.

We have also been told that there will be a coordinating meeting at Berehove between the leaders of splinter groups and those contemplating secession.

Hungarian-Language Trade School in Transcarpathia

94CH0393B Uzhhorod IGAZ SZO in Hungarian
4 Aug 94 p 4

[Interview with Sandor Barta, director of the Silver Grain Farmer Training Course, by Elemer Kovacs; place and date not given: "To Be or Not To Be (a Farmer); Vocational Training in Hungarian"]

[Text] At the beginning of summer, in Nagybereg [Berehy], alongside the seasoned farmers and white-haired smallholders in the graduating class of the Silver Grain Farmer Training Course, a group of young people also successfully passed their examinations. Of all the participants perhaps they were the ones who had prepared the most enthusiastically to put their abilities to the test. Those who knew them were not surprised. As they say, a future professional farmer should have anything that a fast course has to offer at his finger tips. Let us not tease your curiosity any further and reveal that the 28-member team consisted of students of the Makkosjanos branch of the [Munkacs] Mukacheve Agricultural Technical College.

"What does one need to know about the area's newest educational institution?" I asked the principal, Sandor Barta.

[Barta] First of all, the fact that the branch where the classes are conducted in Hungarian is modeled after the former interscholastic educational combines. And the students we have just mentioned are enrolled in the school's farming technology and organization program (2 years and 10 months). As we can see, this is a new initiative in several respects. And to fill you in on a little secret, this year, there will be another group starting which means that any young Hungarian who feels up to it after graduation is encouraged to apply.

Beside training in agricultural engineering and animal science, these young people will also be receiving some basic sales and managerial skills. Not to mention a professional driver's license and tractor operator's permit.

[Kovacs] What about the teaching staff...?

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[Barta] Our basic principle was to win over to our cause well-known practical experts, who are also inspired teachers. I think we have assembled our team, and in the meantime even the issue of where to set up the school has been solved. We struck a deal with the leaders of the local Unitarian congregation regarding the use of the section of a building which belongs to them.

[Kovacs] Hungarian technical training in Subcarpathia. Something which the previous generation could only dream of...

[Barta] Yes, except that in the meantime the value system of the world around us has turned upside down. We already knew back then that the importance of knowledge was being artificially devalued; today, we are at the point where the majority of our young people do not consider getting a diploma to be appealing at all. In general, it has become almost unrealistic to expect anyone to be able to make a living from work. The professions that could earn people a living wage are not taught at state institutions. So it should not surprise anyone that we have few young people with specific and clearly defined career objectives.

[Kovacs] But you are still hopeful, planning to grow....

[Barta] Already last year, we had planned to start offering courses in agricultural science and accounting in addition to our farmer's program. However, since the leaders of the Munkacs Technical College insisted that they would only be willing to expand on their own grounds, this idea was temporarily scrapped. I believe that if the council renounces its ownership rights to these facilities expressly in favor of this institution, then next year we will be able to move forward.

[Kovacs] Any other plans?

[Barta] An agricultural college without a model farm is a one-armed giant. So in the near future we definitely want to establish ourselves on a 20-25 hectare area. We want to set up a breeding colony and an experimental plot, complete with a plough field and an orchard. The way it is supposed to be. Perhaps this will help to turn a profession into a calling.

[Kovacs] A recently started Hungarian-language technical school must have its own unique problems in addition to the usual ones.

[Barta] And quite a few at that. We have been fortunate with our teaching staff. The same cannot be said about the textbooks, however, most of which come from Hungary with long delays. In the meantime, we have formed fruitful liaisons with the Nyiregyhaza Agricultural College, the Nyiregyhaza Horticultural School and the Baktaloranthaza Vocational School.

[Kovacs] As you have mentioned, the acceptance of enrollment applications is under way, and the students, I believe, are currently on vacation.

[Barta] Yes, they are resting up. They have a 10-week-long vocational training ahead of them, so they are entitled to some relaxation. Incidentally—keeping their final objective in mind—several of the future farmers have been spending this time not on large state farms, but alongside outstanding private growers and practicing farmers. And I think that is the way it should be.

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Cardinal Glemp Deplores Cairo Conference

LD0709193394 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1207 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] Warsaw, 7 Sep—Cardinal Jozef Glemp, the primate of Poland, has described the UN population and development conference currently taking place in Cairo as a very sad event, which he has been following with sorrow. The primate shared his remark with journalists at Okecie airport before setting off for a week's visit to Rome.

Speaking about the Cairo conference, the primate said: "I cannot see any common sense here, only ideological and pragmatic calculations going in one direction, which, first and foremost, express the fear of population growth in underdeveloped countries."

"The prevailing trend, instead of raising the civilization standards of those countries, allows them to impose limits on themselves, particularly through abortion. This is a liberal position that does not take man, his dignity, and his development potential into account, but that views him administratively and wants to resolve problems at the cheapest possible cost, so that the rich countries, in particular, would not have to pay the price. The fact that the Vatican is constantly being compared with the fundamentalists or the Islamic countries indicates to what extent the human conscience, particularly when it comes to governing countries, groups, or societies, has moved away from the perception of man in all his complexity and feelings," the primate added.

According to Cardinal Glemp, "the greatest effort should focus on bringing education and civilization to the Third World, which is immersed in chaos. But you need a lot of effort to achieve this," the primate said.

Walesa, Finnish Prime Minister Aho Talk

LD0709195894 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1416 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Excerpts] Warsaw, 7 Sep—President Lech Walesa on Wednesday morning received Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho, who is on an official visit to Poland.

Greeting the Finnish guest, the president stressed that a peaceful Europe, "arranging itself anew," should be shaped together with us.

According to Esko Aho, the new Europe should be arranged in line with the imterests not only of superpowers but also of small countries. Esko Aho drew attention to the fact that our countries are linked by many common interests and matters. "We should make sure that our countries are noticed for their size and place on the European scene," he said. [passage omitted]

"Poland is trying to politically and economically join Western Europe. We have reservations that it is taking a little too long," Walesa said. He added that, since the Warsaw Pact and the CEMA economic structure disintegrated, "nothing major has really happened, and we are still in this undefined sphere." The president "hopes for an understanding" that the reduction of the uncertainty is in the interest of Europe's security. [passage omitted]

Aho, Pawlak Discuss Cooperation

LD0709174494 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1054 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] Warsaw, 7 Sep—Polish-Finnish economic cooperation and issues related to European integration were the main subject of talks held by Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho, and government delegations from the two states on Wednesday morning.

After the completion of the talks at the Office of the Council of Ministers, both prime ministers emphasized that it is in the joint interest of the two countries to develop transport links in the Baltic Sea region, particularly the construction of the so-called Via Baltica, a route leading from Finland across the Baltic states to Poland.

Prime Minister Pawlak pointed out that this undertaking could be taken over by companies being set up to implement the Polish motorway construction program. According to the Finnish guest, the fact that road-building projects are now also being examined more frequently at the European Union forum creates new opportunities for the development of this kind of investment project and for the obtaining of credits to finance them.

Emphasizing that trade cooperation between Poland and Finland has definitely received more impetus in recent years, the prime ministers expressed the hope that Finland's joining the European Union on 1 January 1995 will not have a negative influence on the development of bilateral economic contacts.

According to Pawlak, the politicians agreed on Wednesday that they will be exchanging experiences in the area of European integration, particularly with regard to the adaptation of agriculture to European Union requirements.

Esko Aho added that, during the talks, both sides came out in favor of extending political cooperation in the Baltic region.

Aho Supports EU Integration

LD0809105394 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0957 GMT 8 Sep 94

[Text] Warsaw, 8 Sep—Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho today met Grzegorz Kolodko, deputy prime minister and finance minister.

After the meeting, Kolodko told correspondents that what he was told by the Finnish politician "basically

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means" Finland's support for Poland's efforts to join the European Union, which is to become a full member of this organization in 1995. "We should be there, and I believe in that and work on its being in 2000," declared the deputy prime minister.

According to Kolodko, the two also discussed the way in which the Finnish Government works. "When preparing central economic reform, I observe how it is solved in other countries," Kolodko said. He added that the Polish Government will choose the best solution, taking into account Poland's character. "However, one should learn from everyone, including Finland."

The deputy prime minister stressed that Esko Aho also talked about problems of bilateral economic cooperation, particularly in the shipping industry. According to Kolodko, the Finns appreciate the quality of the Polish shipping industry. He believes that, in the near future, the level of Finnish private investments in Poland will rise. "We should assist on a governmental level in the development of entrepreneurship on the ground so that businessmen can develop Polish-Finnish economic relations on the basis of commercial principles," said Kolodko.

Polish-U.S. Group To Study, Plan Defense

LD0709203194 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1455 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Excerpts] Warsaw, 7 Sep—A protocol on a six-month task of a Polish-U.S. study group that is to draft and implement a system of forecasting in the Polish Armed Forces and also program and plan a defense system conforming to NATO standards was signed in Warsaw today, Colonel Adam Stasinski, of the Defense Ministry press and information office, said.

Stasinski stressed that the main aim of the group was to prepare a batch of computer programs supporting the decisionmaking process, which serves the strengthening of Poland's defense and the development of military forces. These programs may be used in work on a defense budget. Polish experts will deal with the implementation of the results of the group. [passage omitted]

The group was appointed on the basis of an agreement on military cooperation between the Defense Ministry and the U.S. Defense Department in March of this year.

Joint Polish-German Military Exercises Previewed

MM0709131494 Krakow CZAS KRAKOWSKI in Polish 31 Aug 94 p 1

[PAP-attributed article, signed "GK": "A Polish-German Army? FRG Defense Minister Does Not Rule Out Joint Exercises Today, Joint Brigade Tomorrow"]

[Text] Volker Ruehe, defense minister of the German Federal Republic, does not rule out the possibility of creating a mixed German-French-Polish brigade at some point in the future. "It will be possible once Poland becomes a member of NATO and the Western European Union," Ruehe said in an interview for the South German broadcasting station SDR.

Ruehe sees membership of both of the above-mentioned organizations as a necessary precondition for joining such a brigade. At the same time, he pointed out that different degrees of joint actions with the participation of the three countries exist already—for example, within operations carried out by the United Nations. In Ruehe's view, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and other countries are now taking advantage of the opportunity created for them by the Partnership for Peace agreement and are making methodical preparations for future membership.

"I see this as very reassuring," he asserted. "Those states that are currently coming closer to the European Union are also increasing their chances of integration with NATO. Others do not meet the necessary conditions. In those latter cases, it is necessary to think in terms of cooperation instead of integration. Such cooperation has already been set up by the European Union and NATO with Russia," Ruehe stressed.

As Major Andrzej Stegienko, spokesman for the commanding officer of the Krakow Military District, told us, the first field exercises on Polish territory in which a Bundeswehr subunit is scheduled to take part will be the September exercises of the Sixth Air Assault Brigade [BDSz] in Nowa Deba. To avoid unnecessary negative connotations (it was at the Nowa Deba training ground that General, as he then was, Paulus was preparing for an attack against Moscow), both "opposing" sides will be made up by Polish "Red Berets." German troops will not join the exercises until later, in the capacity of umpires. The role the German soldiers have been assigned in this exercise corresponds largely with the tasks of the future so-called Eurocorps, the composition of which would also include a mixed German-French-Polish brigade.

Before that, between 2 and 5 September, a platoon of the Sixth BDSz will leave for Abbeville in France, where it will take part in celebrations commemorating the liberation of that city by General Maczek's Armored Division.

In addition, 45 Polish paratroopers led by Lieutenant Colonel Jerzy Wojcik, Chief of Staff of the Sixth BDSz, will travel to the Netherlands to take part in celebrations commemorating the anniversary of the massive air drop of the Allied troops near Arnhem. Our soldiers will be billeted at the Saxen-Weimarkaserne army barracks, and 30 of them will join 800 British paratroopers in an air drop in the vicinity of the city of Driel. The interest shown throughout the Netherlands in the arrival of the Polish paratroopers is so great that one of the local radio stations will be broadcasting live from aboard the An-26 aircraft during the air drop operation. The program of the Polish visit includes, among other things, meetings with the veterans of the Paratroop Brigade who had

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donated the colors that were presented to the Sixth BDSz, named after General Sosabowski, in an official ceremony at Blonia in Krakow last June.

Proposed New Police, UOP Powers Viewed

MM0809105694 Krakow CZAS KRAKOWSKI in Polish 2 Sep 94 p 2

[PAP report: "Police and UOP Above the Law? Police Acts Before Sejm; All Power in Milczanowski's Hands; Deputies' Doubts"]

[Text] The introduction of the institution of "police provocation" and the expansion of the range of powers entrusted to the police and the State Protection Office [UOP] to include the right to apply wiretapping and correspondence-monitoring methods are the main provisions of the government proposal for amending the so-called police acts, discussed by the Sejm on 1 September. While voting in favor of sending the proposal to be examined by parliamentary commissions, all parliamentary floor groups emphasized that it constituted a threat to civil liberties.

"The objective is to equip our law enforcement bodies with legislative instruments enabling them to effectively combat crime, especially organized crime," Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski said as he described to the deputies the proposed changes in the police acts, including the acts concerning the office of the internal affairs minister, the police, UOP, and the Border Guard.

The amendments provide for the introduction into Polish legislation of the institution of so-called...

...Entrapment Purchase...

...as well as controlled presentation of bribes or undercover monitoring of supplies. The proposal suggests that, in order to obtain evidence of crime, specially planted police officers should be authorized to purchase materials that constitute controlled trade goods (narcotics, weapons, radioactive materials, etc.) or to hand over bribes. These methods could be used by law enforcement bodies in cases where the most dangerous crimes are suspected: hijacking and kidnapping, economic and tax offenses likely to cause "major losses" or depletion of tax revenues, the issuance of counterfeit currencies, or criminal association.

Milczanowski emphasized that it would be necessary for law officers to have received prior information of a criminal activity because they would not be authorized to decide to launch such initiatives themselves. For example, the head of the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW] would need to give instructions for the progress of a consignment of narcotics or weapons to be monitored in order to discover its addressee. At present, law enforcement bodies are obliged to stop such consignments immediately upon discovery. All such methods would have to be authorized in advance by the prosecutor general, who would also have the power to halt the proceedings.

The proposal provides for extending the possibility of applying...

...Wiretapping...

...and correspondence monitoring by law enforcement bodies in instances of major crimes (identical with the cases where the instrument of entrapment purchase would be permitted). At present, these methods can be used only in cases of manslaughter and crimes prosecuted on the strength of international agreements (terrorism, hijacking, and kidnapping). In "the most urgent" cases, the MSW head could himself give instructions to carry out such operations, while, at the same time, applying for their authorization to the prosecutor general. If authorization is not given within 24 hours, all materials obtained through these operations would have to be destroyed.

The amendment proposals would give the police the right to collect fingerprints and other data from and relating to suspects whose identities have not been established. They also provide for the elimination of local police forces and expansion of the rights of municipal guard services to operate also within the territory of rural parishes.

Deputies' Doubts

Deputy Jerzy Dziewulski (Democratic Left Alliance) stated his doubt that law enforcement bodies would indeed honor the obligation to destroy materials obtained by wiretapping in the absence of authorization from the prosecutor general. "Has anyone ever seen the special services destroy documentation of that kind? What do they have copying machines for?" he asked. He said that he did not suspect the special services of deliberate ill will, but neither did he suspect them of being stupid.

Deputy Andrzej Grzyb (Polish Peasant Party) asked whether the extension of the special services' range of powers would, in reality, increase citizens' safety and security. He was not satisfied that the amendment proposals did not infringe the provisions of the Constitution, which, among other things, safeguards the secrecy of correspondence.

Deputy Andrzej Gaberle (Union of Freedom) discerned in the proposals an "alarming tendency" on the part of the MSW to create an enclave ruled by its own laws within the body of the state and to hide behind a Chinese wall of secrecy. Deputy Stanislaw Rogowski (Union of Labor) expressed reservations concerning the institution of "entrapment purchase" and proposed that the MSW should produce an estimate of the expenses the application of such procedures would entail. Deputy Jerzy Gwizdz (Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms) agreed

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with the view expressed last July in the Sejm by Professor Adam Strzembosz, first president of the Supreme Court, according to whom the granting of the proposed new instruments to the police would be tantamount to Poland's coming within sight of the "perimeter of a police state."

Possible Further UOP Personnel Changes Viewed

MM0709142894 Krakow CZAS KRAKOWSKI in Polish 1 Sep 94 p 2

[PAP-attributed report: "Winds of History Blow Through UOP: Szarama, Miodowicz, Niemczyk To Leave...."]

[Text] "Even if it is true that Wojciech Szarama, head of the State Protection Office [UOP] Katowice Division, has resigned, such matters are to be investigated by Gromoslaw Czempinski, the UOP chief," the director of Czempinski's bureau said yesterday.

It was disclosed on the television program "Wiadomosci" on Tuesday that Szarama (former anticommunist opposition activist) resigned in an act of protest against the increasing, in his opinion, influence of pre-1989 Internal Affairs Ministry functionaries in UOP. Everything seems to indicate that Konstanty Miodowicz, current director of the Counterintelligence headquarters, who has recently clashed with Czempinski, will be leaving UOP soon.

This speculation was neither confirmed nor denied by Sylwester Garnet of the UOP Press Group. Miodowicz was an activist of the opposition organization "Freedom And Peace [WiP] involved in the organization of new cadres of the Polish special services. Another WiP activist, Piotr Niemczyk, recently asked to be released from his post of deputy head of UOP intelligence, giving as the reason "fatigue incurred by several years' work at UOP."

Right now, UOP press spokesman Irena Popoff is also leaving her post in favor of "another job." According to unconfirmed information, she could be succeeded by journalist Antoni Styrczula, director of the Radio Information Agency. Czempinski is at present away on holiday. Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski revealed in the Sejm on Tuesday that Czempinski is scheduled to be back at his desk on 5 September.

Conflicts in SLD, Government Discussed

WS0809074094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 7 Sep 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Jan Bazyl Lipszyc: "Disputes over 'Strategy for Poland'; Kolodko Defeated by Miller"]

[Text] The change in the valorization of retirement and other pensions will be made no sooner than 1 January 1996, the Council of Ministers decided following a two-day discussion.

Minister Leszek Miller did not agree to their earlier valorization based on price and not wage increases. Yesterday he declared in Lodz that "neither this year nor in 1995 will the method of pension valorization be changed." According to Miller, introduction of a price-based valorization should be preceded, among others, by changes in the system of social insurances.

Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko is defending the change in the system, which has been proposed in "Strategy for Poland." Yesterday he was in Brussels all day. In the evening we asked him about the consequences the delaying of the change will have for "Strategy" and for the budget. The deputy prime minister replied that he may take a stand on the government's decision no sooner than today, after he returns to Poland.

"Strategy" continues to be the official program of the Pawlak government, and Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko's closest aides say that it is possible that this year the Sejm will adopt more than 10 laws necessary to the implementation of "Strategy"—that is, it is possible to start implementing it in January 1995. Marek Mazur, adviser to the team that is supposed to reform the social insurance system, said that not all of the 14 laws must come into force on 1 January 1995. He believes that necessary first of all are those laws that must be reflected in the budget—for example, the law on the change in the principles of pensions valorization.

It can be seen clearly, however, that at least two conflict areas have appeared between the deputy prime minister's team and some government members.

The bills of the "strategic" laws are being prepared in 10 interministerial teams. Most of them are chaired by close aides of Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko.

Some of them are working in the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM] and not in the ministries that are responsible for the given area (such as Jan Monkiewicz and Jerzy Hausner, who head five of these teams). However, even entrusting the management of a team to a member of the leadership of the appropriate ministry does not guarantee similarity of opinions.

The best known conflict is the dispute between Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko and Labor Minister Leszek Miller over when the method for pension valorization should come into effect. The second team of "Strategy," which is working on the reform of the social insurance system, is headed by Labor Deputy Minister Leslaw Nawacki. The "Strategy" adopted by the government specifies that the valorization of pensions based on the average wage increase, which has been in effect so far, should be abandoned in favor of a valorization based on price increases.

Minister Miller wanted to postpone this change to a not clearly specified future because "it should be the final stage of the reform of the pension system." He stated,

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therefore, that he would not present the new system in the Sejm because the planned reform cannot count on sufficient social support.

Grzegorz Kolodko is also in conflict with URM head Michal Strak. They have different visions of the reform of the center, and the reform bill presented last week at a session of the Council of Ministers by Michal Strak was blocked by the objection of the deputy prime minister. Yesterday the Council of Ministers also discussed the idea of establishing the institution of the State Treasury. However, it did not finally decide whether it would fall under the same ministry, along with privatization, or whether it would be a separate ministry.

Grzegorz Kolodko is a supporter of establishing a treasury ministry and an economy ministry. He has not said so far, however, which ministries it would consist of. He has a reason for this: An announcement specifying which ministries will be liquidated would give rise to conflicts with their heads and probably with some leaders of the coalition parties, as well. This would entail reshuffles in the coalition configuration of forces in the Council of Ministers. Unofficial information suggests that the State Treasury ministry would not necessarily be set up on the basis of the Privatization Ministry.

Among these disputes, we should also count the controversies over the change in the position of the Ciech [foreign trade company trading in chemicals] director: The deputy prime minister unequivocally stood out against Leslaw Podkanski, minister of foreign economic relations, of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. It can be seen thus that, apart from the obvious friction between Grzegorz Kolodko and PSL politicians (it should be recalled that the prime minister keeps putting off the date for signing the third list of enterprises that are to participate in the Mass Privatization Program—and he has not signed the list to date), there are also sharp disputes with part of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. Leszek Miller is considered to be the leader of the "old" faction within the SLD, to be a representative of those who believe that Aleksander Kwasniewski and his group are too liberal and not leftist enough and that they have moved too far from the SLD's election promises. The proposal of the new valorization was also protested by the All-Polish Trade Unions' Agreement.

The political will of the government and of the coalition is necessary to implement the "Strategy for Poland." Lack of support on the part of the PSL and only partial support from the SLD means a weaker position of the economic deputy prime minister in the government. The closer we get to the implementation of some items in "Strategy," opposition (also in the government) will probably increase, not decrease. This may decide the fate of the entire program. It can be seen already today that it will not be possible to begin implementing it in January 1995 in its full version, a version that would be in line with the program adopted by the government.

Trade With CIS, CEFTA, China Examined

94EP0086A Warsaw GAZETA PRZEMYSLOWA I HANDLOWA in Polish No 20, 26 Jul 94 p 5

[Article by Mikolaj Oniszczuk: "Interests in Cooperation With the East"]

[Text] The economic policy of the government devotes much attention to economic cooperation with the Eastern countries of the former USSR, CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association], and China. It also views this cooperation in a comprehensive manner and integrates it into the major tenets of the nation's foreign policy, the policy of cooperating with the entire world. This is a good point of view; we have departed from the unjustified absolutes, from views like "either cooperate with the East or with the West," from the policy of "from fence to fence."

The question, however, constantly returns: whether economic interests join or will join us to the East. Which economic interests join or will join us with the East? It is asked at meetings of businessmen, of politicians, during discussions in academic circles. Because it is, let us attempt to give an answer to these questions.

Beginning from the top "whether" and "which" interests our country has or will have in doing business and cooperating with the countries mentioned, studies, including the study done on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations titled "Policy Principles for Economic Cooperation With the Countries of the Former USSR, Central-East Europe, and China," provide such an answer. Expanded to include the problems of cooperation with East Asia and the initiatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the area of supporting programs, these principles were approved by the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers at its meeting on 18 May 1994. It is worth adding that, in the part concerning the current condition and prospects for cooperation with the countries of the former USSR, the materials of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations received approval during a session of the Sejm Commission for Foreign Economic Relations and Maritime Commerce on 20 April and 25 May 1994.

For the first time in six years, the principles of such a policy are being put into practice.

Unlike the period between 1989 and 1992, neither polemics and slogans, which were not always inclined toward cooperation with the East, nor even "delayed" answers to the question whether and how to cooperate fill the passing time. Rather, the construction of a concrete, real program of cooperation is beginning to dominate. We are then looking for an answer to other questions: how to cooperate effectively, which palpable, desired results of cooperation are to be achieved? When can they be achieved? And that is the main concern for now and at least through 1997.

Drawing on the mentioned principles of the policy for cooperation with the East, answers to four question can be summarized as follows.

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To the question "Whether?," the answer is unambiguous. We have interests, and we are interested in making the best use of them. Taking the long view through the prism of strategic goals, the markets of the former USSR and China are for Poland:

- Large sales markets for investment goods, agricultural and food products, and for many industrial market theories.
- A source for raw materials of basic significance to the economy, including energy resources and many metals (rare earths).
- A support and an opportunity for the implementation of an export-oriented and development-oriented economic policy for the country.

The current weakness of our economy, its lowly position in world trade and the trade deficit, can be overcome gradually by activating exports. Certainly, many opportunities and chances lie in the West, but let us not look in one direction. The markets of the former USSR, 22 million square kilometers, about 300 million inhabitants, not to mention China, cannot be reduced to 10-15 percent of Polish foreign trade. Programs for modernizing and restructuring industry and the economy will draw on the technology and capital of the highly developed countries, but exports must be placed in the West and in the East.

To the question "Which" interests?, a partial answer appears in what has already been said. Looking through the prism of exports, the areas and groups of goods that have a chance to be sold in the particular Eastern countries have been defined fairly precisely. Among the resources used were the most recent evaluations from the Offices of Trade Advisers and Consultants, the proposals of the industrial, trade, and food ministries. The trends in development and demand in the Eastern countries are studied on a current basis. For example, the sales opportunities for investment equipment in China (currently the largest investment sales market in the world) in the area of mining machinery and equipment, power equipment, aviation equipment, etc. Right now, a delegation of Chinese experts is visiting Poland, conducting talks to define the production-export opportunities and needs. We are providing $30 million credit for goods for Kazakhstan to support export shipments from Poland for this large market.

Talks between the agricultural ministries of Poland and Belarus on shipments of agricultural machinery and equipment are being held. It is quite likely that there will be exports of Polish pharmaceuticals. There are many examples.

Generalizing, there are and will be sales opportunities, although one must keep an eye on the competitiveness of the offerings and shipments the entire time. Our competitors are not sleeping, especially the Germans.

An important question is "how" to exploit the opportunities and chances.

This is one of the fundamental problems because much depends on us and, unfortunately, still more on our partners, on the very difficult conditions in the Eastern markets over which we have either no influence or only limited influence.

On our side, we are taking concrete action aiming:

- To support producers, exporters, and exports. This applies to a package of efforts included in the "Principles of a Proexport Policy," including facilitating export-oriented investments, systems for insurance against trade and nontrade risks, credit guarantees, decapitalization of the Corporation for Export Credit Insurance, etc. We are doing these things on the scale of the current abilities of the state budget because the needs are much greater.
- Activation of promotion. This concerns such forms as organizing trade missions, including businessmen (recently to Bashkortostan and Tatarstan), organizing fairs and exhibitions in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and along the Eastern Wall (for example, in Augustow and Suwalki, Zamosc, Bialystok and Biala Podlaska). We provide professional services in seminars for Polish businessmen and those from the Eastern countries; promotional literature for partners in the Eastern countries is being increased.

Resources for Polish commerce and trade posts in Eastern countries for public relations is being increased this year.

This year, 202 billion zlotys from the promotion fund, triple the amount of last year, has been earmarked for these purposes:

- Conducting talks and negotiations with partners to increase trade. There has been an increase in agreements, including avoidance of double taxation, protection of investments, cross-border cooperation, etc., beyond the international agreements on trade and economic cooperation.

Here one must emphasize the political and economic significance of Prime Minister W. Pawlak's visit to Moscow on 15 March 1994. Currently, preparatory work for a meeting of the Joint Polish-Russian Mixed Commission and for talks with the Russian Government delegation in September 1994 is under way.

To the question "when and which" results are expected to be reached, one can answer briefly: We primarily want to overcome the regression and stagnation in turnover with the countries of the former USSR (about $3 billion in 1993) and with the postsocialist countries in general (about $5 billion in 1993). According to initial estimates, by 1997 it will be possible to increase exports to the eastern markets on the order of 50 percent, and the turnover with the postsocialist countries will be on the order of $7.6 to $7.8 billion.

One must, however, examine the fairly difficult conditions for achieving these goals.

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They can be characterized, depending on the criteria, in various ways. In my opinion, we must reckon with two structural conditions that will impede cooperation in the areas of our concern. They are:

- A general, deep economic crisis in the countries of the former USSR, especially in Russia and Ukraine. Recovery should be expected only after 2000. We particularly feel the crisis in investment, which holds down demand for investment equipment, and the increasing indebtedness of our foreign partners, which leads to a lack of resources for Polish exports.
- The lack of progress in market reforms in the Eastern countries. They are slow, not unidirectional, variable. This affects trade with Poland, especially quotas and licenses for shipments (80 percent of the goods in which we are interested), concessions, certificates for imports, and, since 1 July 1994, the new import duty in Russia (a doubling of the import duties including those for agricultural and food goods).

The attitude of the central Russian authorities toward barter transactions is negative (and to 10 percent of imports and 20 percent of exports). Imports are micromanaged, chiefly in Russia (in 1993, imports were reduced 30 percent, imports of foodstuffs and machinery and equipment to the greatest degree). Already during the first quarter of 1994, imports were reduced by more than 24 percent. Thus, the position of the Russian dissidents must arouse concern.

What can we count on (a little optimism)?

First, on variety and competitiveness of export offerings as a result of modernization and restructuring, the entrepreneurship of the private sector and others, continuation of the increase of export-oriented production calculated as a percentage of total production.

Second, on increasing flexibility in policy in the area of foreign trade by our partners. The announced ending of quotas and licenses for exports in Russia may be a harbinger of this change.

Third, on the appearance of industry-by-industry recovery in the economies of Russia and the other countries. Prospects for the second half of 1994 and for 1995 point, for example, to some recovery in investment in Russia.

Fourth, on continuation of the great interest in cooperation and trade between Polish businesses and their Eastern counterparts (in spite of the difficult conditions).

Fifth, on bolder than heretofore use of opportunities for cooperation in the regions and obvods of the Russian Federation and Ukraine and in the provinces and economic zones in China.

Sixth, on gradual improvement of the infrastructure for cooperation, including banking, border crossings, etc. In 1994, for example, the formation of the Polish-Ukraine Bank of Commerce is to be completed. Work in this area with Belarus is well advanced.

Seventh, on strengthening the quantitatively weak infrastructures of Polish trade and commerce posts in the area of the former USSR and the formation of several promotional and trade centers in important economic regions of Russia, Ukraine, and the Central Asian republics.

Let us not, in my opinion, build a vision of "optimistic illusions," but, bit by bit, we will implement these plans; they have a chance of succeeding.

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Melescanu Interviewed About Foreign Relations

AU0809101094 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 3 Sep 94 p 3

[Interview with Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by Roxana Badralexi; place and date not given: "Romania's Steeple Chase Toward NATO and Brussels"]

[Text]

Romania's and Hungary's Roads To Brussels Pass Through Budapest and Bucharest Respectively

[Badralexi] Mr. Minister, how important is the treaty with Hungary?

[Melescanu] Any treaty with our neighboring countries is important, but the treaty with Hungary is even more so. It can also mean the beginning of a historic reconciliation between us. If this treaty is accepted by the parliaments of the two countries, particularly by the public opinion of the two countries, it can constitute a basis for such a reconciliation, which is what everyone wants and is needed for our future integration in the European structures.

[Badralexi] What would be the usefulness of such a treaty with Hungary in the event of great disruptions in the Balkans?

[Melescanu] The treaty would not be effective from a military viewpoint and would not have a direct impact in this respect. Therefore, I can say that the treaty would not have much importance in the event of a Balkan conflict, but would be very important for preventing such a conflict. First of al, the document might set an example for others. Cooperation between Romania and Hungary could mean quite a lot in the political, military, economic, and human rights spheres.

[Badralexi] What would be the implications of this act for our prospects of NATO integration?

[Melescanu] I believe that such a treaty is, as it were, almost a condition for our integration in NATO and the European Union. I do not want you to think that somebody has imposed this condition on us or that it is included in some document. On the contrary.

[Badralexi] But?

[Melescanu] All discussions so far, however, emphasized that one of the conditions for admittance to these structures is to prove that you are capable of resolving all problems through dialogue. Therefore, although we were annoyed when these words were said by various people, they are true, namely, that Romania's road to Brussels passes through Budapest and Budapest's road to Brussels passes through Bucharest. The amicable pressure applied to both Hungary and Romania are very strong.

[Badralexi] If Hungary's government interprets as a deliberate gesture the fact that a party that appears to be hostile to Hungary, at least on the surface, has officially joined our cabinet at this very moment, will the treaty still be finalized?

[Melescanu] I do not think that this is very likely to happen. Recently, I had an opportunity to talk to a high official in the Hungarian Government, after the government reshuffle in our country. During that first contact, I was told that the current Hungarian government is a pragmatic one and the important thing is not what is being said, but what it is being done. My Hungarian partner could not give me a clear answer whether the Hungarian Government has been affected by that reshuffle or not, but he said that Hungary will carefully monitor whether the Romanian National Unity Party's [PUNR's] joining the cabinet will mean an increase in its nationalist character or an increase in the PUNR's sense of responsibility. As a matter of fact, the respective Hungarian official told me that he has never criticized or rejected the PUNR in its totality. There has been a vehement disavowal of Funar [Gheorghe Funar, PUNR president] or others, but the party as a whole has never been rejected. As a matter of fact, it seems that this opinion is shared by many politicians in Budapest. I believe that Hungary attaches too much importance to relations with Romania to be influenced by this problem. Of course, it also depends on how we proceed from now on. I hope that the treaty with Hungary will be signed this year.

As for the Timing of the Reshuffle, I Was Not the Only One To Express Reservations [subhead]

[Badralexi] Mr. Melescanu, were you surprised by the PUNR's joining the government?

[Melescanu] No.

[Badralexi] Does that mean that you were consulted on the matter?

[Melescanu] It is too much to say that I was consulted. I participated in certain general discussions of principle, when I was informed of the PUNR's firm desire to participate in the government.

[Badralexi] Did you express any objections?

[Melescanu] ...I had no objections, because it is a political issue outside my competence. Regarding the timing of the reshuffle, ...I had certain reservations. The PUNR is an important party and I have great respect for many of its representatives. As for the timing of the reshuffle, I can tell you that I was not the only one to express reservations. I was thinking of the way in which this move was going to be received. I do not consider the PUNR as an extremist party, although I agree that there are extremists there, as in other places. But I cannot simply extend this characterization to the whole party.

Russia Could Become a Danger for Romania if Its Democratic Devolopment Is Stopped

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[Badralexi] Let us go back to the issue of treaties. How important is such a treaty with Russia?

[Melescanu] Almost as important as the treaty with Hungary. Regardless of what happens, Russia remains a great military power and a large sales market.

[Badralexi] And a great danger for Romania.

[Melescanu] It could pose a big problem for Romania. I believe that an American has come up with the wording that best expresses the solution for Russia's relations with others: "The United States supports Russia's development as a great democratic power." Therefore, Russia as such is no danger for Romania. However, it could become a danger if its democratic development is stopped. Russia could pose a danger if it is an imperialist country and if it promotes a dictatorial regime of a fascist or communist type...

[Badralexi] If?

[Melescanu] Yes, if. A democratic Russia can be a guarantor in the region. The United States is the greatest power in the world, the only one at this time, and this is not perceived by anyone as a danger for the security of other countries. The reason for that is that the United States is a great democratic power.

[Badralexi] Talking about the Russian imperialism, why did we lose Moldova?

[Melescanu] We did not lose Moldova now, we lost it long ago.

[Badralexi] ...But we did not manage to recover it. The Russians did.

[Melescanu] Yes, and this proves a very crucial thing, namely the importance of the people's awareness. Unfortunately, the majority of Moldovans have a certain awareness of their belonging. If we want to achieve unification, everything must proceed from changing this awareness and make them realize that they belong to the Romanian space. However, they must be helped along this road.

[Badralexi] What is more, they should not be prevented by others from doing it.

[Melescanu] We must also help them ensure that they are not hampered by others.

[Badralexi] In the preliminary discussions on the signing of a treaty with Russia, will Moldova be one of the delicate points?

[Melescanu] I do not think that Moldova, as a subject, will become the object of discussions. However, I have no doubt that, as a problem, Moldova will be on our minds.

It Is Not the Cancellation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Treaty That Counts, But The Effects of This Cancellation [subhead]

[Badralexi] In the context of a treaty with Russia, will the issue of the Romanian treasure [Romanian national valuables deposited in Moscow during World War I] represent an important point of the talks?

[Melescanu] Yes. As a matter of fact, I believe that one of the important effects of this treaty will be its contribution to creating the framework that should also enable them to tackle this problem.

[Badralexi] Does this treasure still exist?

[Melescanu] A large part of it still exists; the fact has been confirmed. The important thing is that new Russia has begun to discuss this problem. The negotiations on this subject have begun and we are in the preparatory stage of putting together the relevant files. However, we are meeting with two kinds of obstacles: First, we must establish the composition of this treasure that found its way to Moscow. Because, with the exception of the National Bank gold—the gold bars recorded in an official report—it is very difficult to prove the composition of that treasure. The second difficulty is finding out where this treasure might be.

[Badralexi] Where could it be?

[Melescanu] Some of our Russian colleagues say that the gold might have been put in circulation. Until now, we did not manage to gather all the documents that would allow us to put forward a seriously substantiated request. The conclusion of a treaty with Russia would have a positive impact on the negotiations in this matter.

[Badralexi] Will the treaty with Russia be concluded in the forthcoming future?

[Melescanu] It is in a more advanced stage even than the treaty with Hungary. What we have not yet managed to do is to agree on a formula that should reflect an extremely important element, namely the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.

[Badralexi] Once that pact has been repudiated, what is left to discuss?

[Melescanu] This is also Russia's position. They claim that they do not see why it is necessary to refer to this pact, once it was declared illegal.

[Badralexi] Is this pact mentioned in our treaty with Germany?

[Melescanu] No.

[Badralexi] On the other hand it is Russia not Germany that took Moldova away from us.

[Melescanu] Yes. For us, such a clause would be recognition of the fact that part of Romania's territory was taken away as a result of this pact.

[Badralexi] In other words, one should rather discuss the concrete effects of this treaty.

[Melescanu] This is how things stand.

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(Badralexi] Will the treaty with Russia include a clause about Russia's noninterference in our integration within NATO?

[Melescanu] The preamble of the discussions will specify several principles, including that of noninterference in the domestic affairs of the other side.

[Badralexi] Do you think that the Russians will accept that?

[Melescanu] I do not think that there will be any kind of Romanian control over Russia, or Russian control over our country.

[Badralexi] So, we will not raise this problem, even though things are clear as far as the Russians are concerned—by that I mean that they have clearly expressed their disapproval about the NATO integration of the former communist countries?

[Melescanu] Of course, we respect this viewpoint. But President Clinton has also said that the problem is not so much whether NATO expands, but when. Therefore, we are confronted with two statements and we respect them both...

The Appointment of Ambassador Moses to Bucharest Is a Positive Fact and a Warning [subhead]

[Badralexi] Finally, so as not to avoid the Americans in our discussion, I would like you to comment on the significance of the appointment of the new U.S. ambassador to Bucharest, Mr. Alfred Moses.

[Melescanu] ...It has a positive significance. I believe that it reflects the particular importance attached by the United States to relations with Romania. Unlike Ambassador Davis, Mr. Moses is a political figure with direct access to President Clinton. Therefore, his appointment primarily means a direct link between the U.S. President and Romania. Of course, there is another element, too: Mr. Moses is also the chairman of the U.S. Jewish Committee, and I believe that—if we are to attach significance to it—it is also a recognition of the important support enjoyed by Romania from the Jewish community in the United States.

[Badralexi] Therefore, is it a positive thing that the new ambassador is also a prominent Jew?

[Melescanu] I know what you are referring to. There is no doubt that the presence here of an ambassador belonging to the U.S. Jewish community, an activist in the sphere of human rights, is also indicative of the importance attached by the U.S.Government to that aspect of the relations between Romania and the United States. I am sure that Mr. Moses will pay particular attention to those problems as well.

[Badralexi] Therefore, can we also consider it as a kind of warning for us?

[Melescanu] Yes. It is evidence of concern along those lines.

Melescanu, UDMR Leaders Discuss Hungary Trip

AU0209133794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 100 GMT 2 Sep 94

[Text] At the Foreign Ministry, Teodor Melescanu, minister of state and minister of foreign affairs of Romania, received members of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] leadership, among them UDMR President Bela Marko and the UDMR Honorary President Laszlo Tokes.

The meeting, which is part of the foreign minister's practice of consulting with representative of parties and political formations in Romania on issues of major foreign policy interest, was attended by Mr. Victor Hrebenciuc, general secretary of the government and coordinator of the Council for National Minorities.

The talks at the Foreign Ministry were held in the context of Melescanu's upcoming official visit to Budapest. The talks focused on certain issues that will be included in the agenda of the Romanian-Hungarian talks, mainly in connection with the basic political treaty and provisions regarding the rights and freedoms of persons who belong to the Hungarian minority in Romania. During the talks, the sides stressed the importance of this treaty both in developing bilateral relations and for the integration of both countries into European structures.

The Romanian side also reiterated the wish to resume negotiations for the finalization of the text of the treaty as soon as possible, our correspondent Doina Seiciuc informed us.

PUNR Leader Urges Outlawing, Isolating UDMR

AU0509190094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 5 Aug 94

[Text] Gheorghe Funar, president of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], sent an open letter to Mr. Emil Constantinescu, president of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR]. The letter points out that on 26 August, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] published its stand on the Romanian-Hungarian treaty, a stand which plainly and clearly confirms the final goal of the actions begun in December 1989, namely to sever Transylvania from the holy body of Romania and to annex this ancient Romanian province to Hungary. The PUNR, the letter reads, has stressed from the very moment of its founding the danger posed for Romania by the UDMR and its anti-Romanian actions at home and abroad. At the same time, the letter emphasizes that, by adopting the policy of small steps, the UDMR has scored some success, thanks to the support granted by the CDR and by taking advantage of the lack of firmness in implementing the Romanian state's laws.

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The letter also stresses that, in its endeavors to achieve its final goal, the UDMR is currently planning to again use Mr. Emil Constantinescu and the CDR in order to ensure that the Convention on the Protection of Minorities becomes an integral part of the political treaty between Romania and Hungary and also to ensure that the law on education is adopted in its current form by Romania's parliament, including Chapter 12. The letter outlines the stratagem used by the UDMR to attain its anti-Romanian goals, particularly by joining the CDR. The letter points out that, if support for the UDMR does not end, the political futures of both Mr. Emil Constantinescu and the CDR will be, quote, somber.

The text of Gheorghe Funar's letter also stresses that the Hungarian minority in the United States, numbering almost 2 million people, did not ask the U.S. President, Congress, and Government to introduce bilingualism, territorial autonomy, education and instruction in the Hungarian language at all levels, and special legal status. Moreover, the Hungarian minority in the United States has never complained to various international bodies about the non- observance of human rights. All parties in Romania should take a stand against the UDMR position on the Romanian-Hungarian treaty and prevent this treaty including the Convention on the Protection of Minorities, the letter reads. The letter also expresses the hope that Mr. Emil Constantinescu and the CDR will support the start of procedures for outlawing the UDMR.

PUNR speaks out for the conclusion of a political treaty between Romania and Hungary, which includes the solemn commitment to the inviolability of borders and the lack of any territorial claims. At the same time, the letter addressed to the CDR president by the PUNR leader also points out that, quote: The PUNR, as a government party, will not permit that the UDMR claims should be included in this treaty, that is the Convention on Protecting Minorities—a document designed to create concrete conditions for making Transylvania autonomous and later annexing it to Hungary. The UDMR requirements on the Law on Education and the Romanian-Hungarian treaty aim at hampering Romania's efforts to integrate itself into the Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security interests—end of quote.

In his letter, Mr. Gheorghe Funar expresses the conviction that the maturity and experience of the CDR president will contribute to eliminating the UDMR from the CDR and isolating it on the domestic and international political scene.

The open letter addressed to CDR President Mr. Emil Constantinescu is signed by Gheorghe Funar, PUNR president, and is dated Cluj-Napoca, 5 September 1994.

PNTCD Agrees to 'Certain' UDMR Demands

AU0509160294 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 5 Sep 94

[Text] The PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] believes that the basic political treaty between Romania and Hungary represents a starting point and will make a contribution to ending the historic conflict between the two countries, said Senator Radu Vasile, PNTCD spokesman, at today's news conference of this party.

In turn, PNTCD First Deputy President Ion Diaconescu wished to note that the his party agrees to certain demands of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], however, in no way can it accept the idea of regional autonomy and the attempts of the Hungarian minority to separate from the Romanian community.

The elements expressed by the UDMR are unacceptable, said Mr. Ion Diaconescu, because they can open the way for certain actions aimed at separation from the Romanian national unitary state. In this context, the PNTCD vice president, Deputy Ion Ratiu, said that the appeal for minorities' collective rights is considered undemocratic in the international arena.

In connection with another issue, the PNTCD leadership voiced its vehement protest against the decision of the authorities in the Republic of Moldova to suspend the activity of the FPCDM (Christian- Democratic Popular Front of Moldova]. In its capacity as member of the European Christian Democratic Union, the PNTCD intends to draw the attention of international fora to the attitude of the Chisinau authorities, which are qualified as traitors of the cause of Romanian unity.

Regarding the draft law on mass privatization issued by the government, Senator Radu Vasile expressed his view that, given the fact that privatization is a national problem, the executive should initiate discussions on this issue with all political forces, especially with the opposition.

After recalling the fact that the opposition is elaborating its own variation for accelerating the privatization process, Deputy Mircea Ciumara drew attention to the fact that the government's draft does nothing except gives an impoverished population that is concerned with its survival, the illusion of some benefits without work.

Talking about relations within the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania], Ion Diaconescu, first deputy president of the PNTCD, expressed his amazement regarding the decision of the PL '93 [Liberal Party '93] to run in the local partial elections on separate lists and stressed that single lists are the major way to express the political message of the CDR, our correspondent Elena Perdichi informed us.

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Serbia Agrees To Monitor Bosnia Embargo

AU0809065294 Paris AFP in English 2349 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] Bucharest, Sept 8 (AFP)—Serbia has agreed to accept the presence of non-military observers to monitor its embargo on Serb forces in Bosnia, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe disclosed here late Wednesday [7 Sep].

He also said an international Contact Group on Bosnia-Herzegovina would urge the gradual lifting of sanctions against Serbia if the monitoring operation showed that the embargo had been effective.

Juppe was speaking after a meeting in Berlin of the group, made up of Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States.

"I think one can say there was a good meeting, with the five participants showing a willingness to remain cohesive... Things are moving in the right direction," he said after a dinner given in his honor by Romanian authorities.

Juppe said international mediators David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg "informed the group of an agreement in principle by the Belgrade authorities for the installation of an observation mechanism to ensure that the embargo is being respected."

"Mr. Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg will determine, in accord with Belgrade, the details of the monitoring operation, which will not be military in nature and will not implement checks but will observe what happens, having recourse to this or that international organization."

Juppe said observers could be supplied by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

He told reporters here the Contact Group planned to submit two resolutions to the United Nations, one of which would call for a tightening of sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs for their refusal to accept an international peace plan.

The second would advocate the progressive suspension of sanctions against the Srpska republic "provided the observation mechanism shows that the embargo (against the Bosnian Serbs) is effective."

Juppe said international airliners would again be authorized to land at Belgrade airport while Serbia would be allowed to resume sporting and cultural links with the rest of the world.

But he cautioned that the Berlin meeting of the Contact Group had been at the level of experts and stressed that it was now up to the governments concerned to confirm the decisions taken Wednesday.

The group is scheduled to meet at ministerial level at the end of September at the United Nations in New York.

The Contact Group had been pressing Serbia, and its president, Slobodan Milosevic, to accept some form of international monitoring along the Serbian-Bosnian border to confirm that its embargo was being respected.

Serbia imposed the restrictions in August after the Bosnian Serb leadership rejected an international peace plan that would have given it control of 49 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina, down from the 70 percent it currently administers.

The remaining 51 percent would be in the hands of a Moslem-Croat federation founded in March.

Serbia, chafing under international sanctions for its past support for the Bosnian Serbs, had hoped that the measures would be lifted following its decision to impose the embargo.

Izetbegovic on Risks of Lifting Arms Embargo

AU0709170594 Paris AFP in English 1645 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 7 (AFP)—Bosnia's Moslem president Alija Izetbegovic said Wednesday his government fully appreciated the dangers inherent in lifting the UN arms embargo against ex-Yugoslavia but reaffirmed his support for such a move.

Asked if he was willing to sacrifice the three eastern enclaves, which observers say could be the first casualties of an end to the weapons ban, he replied: "I know that."

Speaking at the end of a press conference on the abandoned papal visit Izetbegovic said: "We are aware of the consequences and problems (posed) by the lifting of the arms embargo.

"But if we compare the positive and the negative sides of the lifting of the arms embargo, we will opt for the weapons, inspite of all the difficulties that such a decision will impose.

"Why? Because here the survival of the state and the people is at stake. This country cannot be saved by UNPROFOR (the UN Protection Force), it can only be saved by an efficient defence. And such an efficient defence is not possible."

Tens of thousands of Moslems are crammed into the tiny eastern enclaves of Zepa, Gorazde, and Srebrencia—all UN-declared safe havens—which are completely surrounded by hostile Bosnian Serb forces.

Last month Serb leader Radovan Karadzic threatened to cut off all supplies to the enclaves if the Serbian Republic continued its political and economic blockade against his Pale-based rebel republic.

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Belgrade imposed the sanctions August 4 to punish the Serbs' rejection of an international peace plan dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Serbs and a nascent Croat-Moslem Federation.

Zubak Threatens To Take More Land From Serbs

LD0709154994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1515 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] Zagreb, 7 Sep (TANJUG)—Muslim-Croat Federation President Kresimir Zubak has threatened to take more land from Serbs than set in the "Contact Group" map unless they accept it by October 15.

"Bosnian Serbs will not keep even the 51 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina," Zubak said in an interview to the Zagreb daily VECERNJI LIST on Wednesday.

The Muslims and Croats are a majority in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on that basis their federation should get 58 percent of the land, Zubak said.

Zubak said Bosnian Muslims and Croats "will have to accept 51 percent of the territory until October 15," as envisaged under the Contact Group plan.

United States President Bill Clinton said that Bosnian Muslims would be exempt from the arms embargo on former Yugoslavia if Bosnian Serbs did not accept the Contact Group plan by October 15.

Under the plan, the Muslim-Croat federation will get 51 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Srpska republic 49 percent.

Zubak said there was a lull in the implementation of the Washington agreement and the constituting of the federation. He said the Muslim side believed the interests of their republic took precedence over those of the federation.

"We consider that it is actually quite the opposite," Zubak said.

"As the authority of the Muslim-Croat Federation is established, the Muslim Republic and the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, as well as the Autonomous Province of West Bosnia will disappear," Zubak said.

Zubak said he believed that it had been necessary to preserve the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for a certain time because of its international recognition, but "only until the federation is fully constituted."

"A union will probably be created—from the federation and the part where Bosnian Serbs live as a majority," Zubak said.

Bosnian Muslims and Croats signed an agreement on a Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina under strong pressure from the United States in Washington in March.

The agreement envisages that the federation enter into confederal relations with Croatia at a later date.

A referendum was held in the Srpska republic on August 27- 28 on the Contact Group map. It was rejected by an overwhelming majority, but the Bosnian Serb government has repeatedly said it was for the resumption of the peace process.

Zubak Views Federation Status, Peace Plan

AU0709212594 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 7 Sep 94 p 7

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak by S. Lovrenovic; place and date not given: "The Federation Shall Survive"]

[Text] After the signing of the Washington Agreement, the Constitution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation was adopted and the process of the creation of the Croat-Muslim state started rapidly. However, parallel to the problems surrounding the acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan, obstacles and problems are occurring somehow. We discussed the seriousness of these problems with the President of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Kresimir Zubak:

[Lovrenovic] Mr. Zubak, the Federation will be six months old soon, however, many things remained unresolved. Why are the problems arising now?

[Zubak] It is true that some obstacles have arisen in the implementation of the agreement. There are several reasons for it. The objective reasons are that the people involved in the drawing up of the Washington Agreement and the Constitution are busy, either because of their obligations in the talks with the international community or because each of us had to implement certain tasks in our own spheres. However, it is true that, initially, we did not organize ourselves well and determine which institutions are competent, authorized, and obliged to work on the implementation of the Federation. A deadlock occurred after the election of the Federation's officials. For this reason, Vice President Ganic and I have taken the initiative and passed several bills. We initiated the creation of expert teams and groups that would encourage the constitution of the municipal assemblies, followed by the formation of the cantons, and finally the election of the Federal Assembly. Subsequently, some Bosniak-Muslim circles reproached us for seizing something that was not within our sphere of authority.

[Lovrenovic] Is this authority linked to the duality of the Federation and the Republic? Can you, as a lawyer, explain the situation in which the Federation is "a member" of the Republic?

[Zubak] Several legal systems exist in the transitional period that will disappear when the new legal system is set up—the system of the Federation. All other legal systems of the Republic, of the Croatian republic of

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Herceg-Bosna, and also of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, of the Tuzla District, should disappear parallel with the establishment of the Federation's authorities. However, the Bosniak-Muslim side believes that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is superior, hierarchically, to the Federation. By interpreting the constitutional provisions literary, we believe that the situation is quite the opposite. It is written there that, with the setting up of the Federation's authorities, the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot interfere with their jurisdiction.

[Lovrenovic] Does the mistake perhaps lie in "the model" that allowed the existence of two leaderships: the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the president of the Federation?

[Zubak] This could not be resolved differently than how it was envisaged in the Constitution. Because of the international recognition of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a certain organization had to be retained at a certain point. However, this should last only until the Federation is fully established.

Actual Recognition of Herceg-Bosna

[Lovrenovic] The Sarajevo media and the leaderships consider that the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna has been abolished, deeming it a parastate and referring to it as the so-called, while they continue to regard the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as legitimate.

[Zubak] I believe that this is completely wrong and further proves that they are not sufficiently familiar with the Constitution of the Federation. It is true that the Constitution of the Federation does not use the term of Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna, however it does use the term "the existing administrations," and that also includes the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna. Finally, this is how it has been presented in the media, while in practice we have seen cases when the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina stuck certain deals with the Government of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna. This means that it has, in fact, recognized it.

[Lovrenovic] The Federation is defined territorially. First it was 58 percent and then, after the adoption of the plan, 51 percent. How big is this territory now, after the Serbian rejection of the plan?

[Zubak] We did not discuss the issue of territories. On the basis of the majority of the two peoples, we have the right to 58 percent, however, until 15 October, while the [Contact Group] peace plan is still topical, we must accept 51 percent.

[Lovrenovic] What if the Serbs do not accept the plan then?

[Zubak] Then we shall have to liberate the territory of the Federation. We would not stop at 51 percent in that case.

[Lovrenovic] Will the Federation survive the obviously somewhat-extended transitional period?

[Zubak] I thing it will. Despite everything, particularly the different interpretations and approaches to the Federation that we and the Bosniak-Muslims have. If there is no other option, we will demand international arbitration by those countries that have participated the most in the negotiations. Here, I am primarily referring to the United States, Germany, Austria, and Turkey.

Union of the Federation and the Serbs?

[Lovrenovic] Do you think that the United States have backpeddled regarding the pressures on Serbia?

[Zubak] Relations within the Contact Group are changing with time. When a firm stance was voiced that pressure would be employed in order to realize the agreement, relations within the Contact Group were probably such that the United States had reason to be convinced of such a result. It appears that unity within the Contact Group is somewhat different than the United States imagines it to be.

[Lovrenovic] Karadzic is again offering to divide Bosnia with the Croats?

[Zubak] Karadzic contests the right of the Bosniak-Muslim people to a state and claims that they will not have it. In place of the Republic, there will probably be a union between the Federation and the part where Serbs are in the majority. Therefore, there will be a division into two entities, but the Bosniak-Muslim people will in no way lose their state.

[Lovrenovic] What is happening with the confederation with Croatia? Many leaders of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna emphasize that there can be no Federation without confederation.

[Zubak] This is definitely the case. We signed an agreement in Washington on the basis of which we should sign a confederal agreement. In reality there are numerous relations between Bosnia- Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia that comprehend a number of confederal elements. These are transit, economic cooperation, and other issues. When this crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina is over, then the Federation will formally sign the confederal agreement with the Republic of Croatia.

[Lovrenovic] Does this mean that Kozyrev is right to offer confederation with Serbia to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs?

[Zubak] Formally and legally speaking yes, however, not in reality. What we have here is not an agreement among Croats, but an agreement on the relations of Croats and Muslims from Bosnia- Herzegovina with the Republic of Croatia; the Serbs and the Yugoslav Peoples' Army are the aggressors and cannot have the same status. Things cannot be equated in this way.

Croats Supported the Agreement [subhead]

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[Lovrenovic] How true it is that there are numerous opponents to the Federation within the political structures of both ethnic communities, and that the Washington Agreement was actually imposed and obstructed by both sides?

[Zubak] There really are those who believe that this political solution is not satisfactory. It has been pointed out in all the Croatian people's structures—in the House of Representatives of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna, at the HDZ Congress for Bosnia-Herzegovina, within the Catholic church, in the Sabor of the Republic of Croatia, by the rulling parties and the opposition, at the Pan-Croatian congress—that the Washington Agreement satisfies the interests of the Croatian people. The Bosniak-Muslim people do not state this as explicity and the fact is that a segment of it, even its leadership, with its interpretation of the agreement and its attitude toward the Federation demonstrates that it does not truly favor the Federation. The Croats will insist that the Federation's Constitution is fully implemented.

[Lovrenovic] You speak of HDZ support for Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, you have criticized the election of the leadership, branding them as opponents of the Washingon Agreement?

[Zubak] I was not satisfied with the manner in which the leadership was elected. I think that this procedure was not approved and supported anywhere. Therefore, it does not object to the individuals, but to the procedure. Speaking about certain individuals, I was quoting their statements. I am glad to hear that they have publicly demonstrated that they are ready and willing and that they want to puruse a policy established within the HDZ, which has clearly stated that it favors the Washington Agreement.

[Lovrenovic] Does that mean that two factions—Zubak-Prlic on one hand, and Kordic-Markovic on the other—do not exist?

[Zubak] I believe that this is just speculation. Speaking about the implementation of the agreement, we are definitely all in favor of its realization. Sometimes we differ in method, form, and pace. Often, for example, Kordic and myself would be on one side and Prlic and Markovic on the other, or vice-versa, however, this was never significant. These are merely the nuances.

Insults From East Mostar

[Lovrenovic] What about the incidents in central Bosnia on the basis of which the Serbian media claim that the Federation is dead?

[Zubak] Recently, the incidents have become more frequent and might turn into bigger conflicts. However, I believe that they will never again escalate into a conflict between the two peoples. The problem lies in fact that we have not constitued the authoriites from top to bottom yet. Had we done so, then those of us in authority could assume the obligations.

[Lovrenovic] The Bosniak-Muslim media and President Izetbegovic refer to Mostar as "a black spot."

[Zubak] It is evident that incidents will continue to occur there for some time. The Serbian media and certain services are encouraging them. The setting up of the Federation is the biggest problem for them, followed by the media. Statements, commentaries, and insults at the expense of the Croatian people frequently come from eastern Mostar, which provoke reactions. In light of this, I officially asked President Izetbegovic, [Prime Minister] Silajdzic, and [Federation Vice President] Ganic to stop the media war.

[Lovrenovic] There is also the controversial question of authority in foreign policy and appointments to diplomatic and consular missions?

[Zubak] We will put this issue on the agenda. We shall publicly disclose the current structure of the diplomatic missions. Not only in the sense of ethnic representation, but also in the sense of qualifications, family connections, and the like. It stems clearly from the Constitution of the Federation that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a international legal entity, however, in the international relations, the Federation acts on the basis of the international legal subjectivity and integrity of Bosnia- Herzegovina. Therefore, the Federation pursues and concerns itself with the foreign policy issues, but it must never endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, all future appointments to the diplomatic-consular missions can be carried out by the president or vice president of the Federation, however, since the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to exist, we shall have to follow the procedure applied in the election of the government. That means that as the Federation we shall participate in decisions regarding appointments.

[Box 1, p 7]

Opening of Roads for Return

[Lovrenovic] Refugees say that Zubak, Izetbegovic, and other politicians can go anywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the common people cannot?

[Zubak] Unfortunately, this is true. We, the Croats, are encouraging the opening of all roads, however, we did not obtain the consent of the representatives of the Bosniak-Muslim people. That is why a UN officer has left the talks. They are constantly trying to impute—I can see this through the media on the territory under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army—that we, the Croats, actually do not favor the implementation of the Constitution. This is not the case. We favor its implementation because this would thwart the maintenance of old relations and that is precisely why we are portrayed as being against the Federation. We are two equal ethnic groups. We will not reconstruct old relations and we cannot except that.

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[Box 2, p 7]

Why Are There No Croats in the Ministry of Internal Affairs?

[Lovrenovic] The Croats have appointed their ministers and deputy ministers, however, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in the DKP [expansion unknown], and other institutions there are no Croats. Why?

[Zubak] This is proof that some people in the structures of authority of the Bosniak-Muslim people are against the consistent implementation of the Washington Agreement. We insisted that the government and its services be reconstructed in accordance with the Agreement. The information about representation of the Croats is shocking. Out of more than 550 employees in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, only 22 are Croats, of which only one is in a senior position. In the Ministry of Social Welfare there is only one Croat. All in all, among more than 1,000 employees, less than 10 percent are Croats.

We have requested that these issues be put on the agenda, but individuals representing the Bosniak-Muslim people blocked this request. However, this is not a blockade of the Bosnian-Muslim people. I believe that this will be solved at the next political negotiations.

[Box 3, p 7]

"Narrowly" Escaped Death

The DPA news agency has learned through the Sarajevo ONASA news agency and reported yesterday that President of the Bosnia- Herzegovina Federation Kresimir Zubak on 5 September narrowly escaped death when his aircraft flying in the vicinity of Mt. Igman was targeted by Serbian automatic weapons. Zubak's aircraft was riddled by bullets and one of his guards says that "it is a real miracle that nobody was injured during the 10-minute attack."

Contact Group Criticized for 'Bargaining'

AU0709155394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Report by Sabahudin Vukovic from Berlin]

[Text] (?A team) of experts of five countries here in Berlin, members of the Contact Group for Bosnia-Herzegovina, could be called the council for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even though the experts are working behind closed doors, information leaks out constantly. That there is no harmony within the Contact Group is proved by the fact that the experts are wasting most of the time in phoning to Moscow, Paris, or Washington.

Nobody here is concealing any longer that real bargaining with our country is underway. The Russians (?have come out) with the idea that Karadzic might be indulged if the authorities in Sarajevo were to agree to Srebrenica going to Pale, while Sarajevo and its surroundings would go to the Bosnia-Herzegovina state. The second deal is Prijedor and Sanski Most in exchange for Jajce, and so on, all to please the Russians and Belgrade.

What is sure is that the five [word indistinct] are not considering new sanctions against Belgrade at this moment and that there will be no talk of this. France is pushing persistently for new concessions for the Bosnian Serbs, first confederation and then a sure unification with Serbia, while at the same time France [words indistinct] to condemn a new wave of ethnic cleansing and the offensives of the Bosnian Serbs.

The arrival of [Deputy Russian Foreign Minister] Vitaliy Churkin in Berlin is only a signal that Moscow does not wish to lose the political initiative at this moment, even though it is not likely that the United States and Germany would budge from their position that there can be no award for Milosevic, and especially not for Pale. The only problem is that those here have the time to discuss this in great detail and we do not. The question is whether the members of the Contact Group have the right to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina. As we know, the official Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities have not given them the mandate to do so.

Izetbegovic Says Akashi Sabotaged Papal Visit

AU0709135394 Paris AFP in English 1303 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 7 (AFP)—Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic launched a bitter attack on UN special envoy to ex-Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, accusing him of sabotaging a papal visit to Sarajevo by exaggerating security concerns.

Pope John Paul II had been "deceived" by Akashi's letter which had played a "decisive" role in the cancellation of Thursday's historic trip, he told a packed press conference at the Holiday Inn here.

Earlier UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] spokeswoman Claire Grimes said the Akashi letter had detailed the safety risks but had not warned against the trip: "It is not the role of Mr. Akashi to advise against such a visit."

"We did not recommend against the visit," she said.

Izetbegovic said the cancellation had been forced by the threats from the rebel Bosnian Serbs led by Radovan Karadzic, but added "this position (the cancellation) was godfathered by UNPROFOR as well."

The Akashi letter presented "an abstract danger (...) as a concrete risk" he said, and went on: "I don't think that the letter was the only reason for the decision (to cancel the trip), however, I believe that it had a decisive influence on that decision."

If the UN had taken firm action against Serb breaches of the 20-kilometre (12.5-mile) heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo "then security would be almost 100 percent," he said.

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Also Blames UK, France

AU0709165594 Paris AFP in English 1538 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 7 (AFP)—Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic took a sideswipe at Britain and France on Wednesday, tacitly accusing them of opposing the pope's planned visit to the besieged Bosnian capital.

In a lengthy press conference in which he blamed the UN special envoy to ex-Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi for sabotaging the now abandoned trip, Izetbegovic hinted London and Paris had helped block the trip.

After a cryptic quote from the Bible—"I will quote Jesus, 'You will recognise them according to their deeds'"—he said "certain Western countries probably did not want attention to be drawn to Bosnia.

"Germany and the United States of America didn't have anything against the visit of the pope, (...) Holland, Belgium, the Scandinavian countries, Spain, Italy, (favoured the visit) therefore I cannot say that Western countries in general didn't want the trip."

Asked if he meant Britain and France—two notable absentees from the list of states backing the visit—Izetbegovic replied: "I believe I was clear enough."

Commenting the absence of UN Bosnia commander Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose during preparations for the historic trip, the president remarked: "I have to admit that this absence came at an odd time," but said he accepted the general's explanation.

Akashi Letter Published

AU0809090394 Paris AFP in English 0827 GMT 8 Sep 94

[By Jon Boyle]

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 8 (AFP)—A letter by UN special envoy to ex-Yugoslavia which sparked the cancellation of the papal visit did not urge Pope John Paul II to scrap his trip but laid heavy emphasis on the security risks, according to a translation pubished here Thursday [8 September].

Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic charged Wednesday that Yasushi Akashi's letter to the Vatican had "a decisive influence" on the pope's decision to abandon his historic trip to Sarajevo, but UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] spokeswoman Claire Grimes insisted Wednesday that "we did not recommend against the visit."

Although it contained no specific advice to cancel the trip, the letter carried by OSLOBODENJE Thursday was couched in terms which highlighted the security risks.

A printed extract of the letter, written in English, read: "We are pleased to offer assistance should his holiness decide to proceed with his visit, but are very concerned about the security risks involved.

"We will be sending on a daily basis a risk assessment so that the Vatican may take decisions with a complete awareness of all the implications."

A source who had seen the letter told AFP Wednesday that the letter included a warning that "there is a worrisome possibility of a covert attack (against the pope, designed) to blame the other parties."

The letter said the pope should be aware of the security dangers and the limitated protection the UN could provide.

The proximity of the confrontation lines within the capital and sophisticated weapons used by all sides in the conflict, particularly near the airport, posed a serious threat.

It was impossible to guarantee the pope's security at the airport, which was frequently targetted by gunmen from both sides, the letter warned.

Although the final decision was up to the pope, Akashi said he wanted to inform the pontiff of the seriousness of the risks he would incur.

However, if he decided to press ahead with the visit—despite worries about security and the lack of Serb support for the trip—UNPROFOR would provide security at the airport and into the city, where it would hand over responsibility to the Bosnian authorities.

Muslim-Croat Relations in Central Bosnia 'Tense'

LD0709201594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1611 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, 7 Sep (TANJUG)—Muslim-Croat relations in central Bosnia are extremely tense once again and Bosnian Croat troops in the area are on alert, Croat Radio Herceg-Bosna said Wednesday. The radio said that Croat forces around the towns of Vitez, Busovaca, Novi Travnik and Uskoplje (formerly Gornji Vakuf) are "ready to answer without hesitation" any provocation from the Muslim units.

Relations between members of the Croat and Muslim armed forces have lately reached "that degree of hostility and mutual mistrust which preceded last year's conflicts," the radio said.

Bosnian Croats and Muslims clashed fiercely in spring last year for power over territories with mixed Croat-Muslim populations in central and southwestern Bosnia.

The fighting ended in March this year when the two sides formed a Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia under strong influence from the United States in Washington. The tension in the field, however, remains.

The radio of the Bosnian Croat state said Bosnian Muslim Leader Alija Izetbegovic viewed the Washington

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agreement as a "Muslim military-political triumph and the final collapse of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna," the Bosnian Serb SRNA news agency said.

Croats are ready "to answer without restraint any trick by Izetbegovic," the radio said.

Muslim-Croat conflicts in central Bosnia especially aggravated last week in the area of Vitez when Muslims tried to move some units into the city of Mostar in southern Bosnia through Croat-controlled territory.

Radio Herceg-Bosna said Muslim-Croat talks were interrupted during this incident, in which both sides suffered losses.

The radio said the Croat negotiators had said the talks on coordinating military activities would continue only if the Sarajevo Muslim authorities agreed to discuss changes in the borders of the cantons in central and western Bosnia.

These borders are at present "devastating for Croats," a Croat negotiator was quoted as saying.

Bosniaks, Croats Fail To Agree on Refugees

AU0709191694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Excerpt] A meeting of the representatives of the Bosniaks and the Croats from the municipalities of Prozor, Gornji Vakuf, and Bugojno was held in the headquarters of the joint subcommittee in Gornji Vakuf today. Here is a report prepared by Borka Rudic and Sulejman Jugo:

[Begin recording] [Rudic] The purpose of today's meeting of the representatives of local authorities of Bugojno, Prozor, and Gornji Vakuf with the UN officers and the members of the subcommittee, which has its headquarters in Gornji Vakuf, was to sign an agreement on the return of refugees in this part of the Federation. The agreement envisages a gradual return of refugees and a revision of the return after each phase of this process.

The agreement envisages five phases of return. Initially, five Croatian families would be allowed to return to Bugojno and five Muslim families would be allowed to return to Prozor. A return of 10 families would ensue afterward and so forth.

From January to June 1995, all families would be encouraged to return to Bugojno and Prozor, however, not more than 20 at a time.

The final part of the agreement envisages that a similar policy would be pursued in other towns where the refugees from Prozor and Bugojno are situated. The UN representatives would provide considerable assistance in these activities.

After [word indistinct] discussion in which the representatives of the Bosniak and the Croatian sides from Bugojno, Prozor, and Gornji Vakuf took part, and after numerous criticisms from both sides, they nevertheless decided not to sign the agreement. Namely, the Croatian side objected to the partial return of population, quoting the Constitution of the Federation and the provision on the simultaneous return of all refugees to their homes.

In principle the representatives of the Bosniaks supported the partial return of refugees as an impetus to the overall efforts to return refugees to their homes. However, they raised objections regarding the order of return of the Muslim families to Prozor. [passage omitted] [end recording]

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Owen, Stoltenberg Meet With Serb Krajina Leaders

LD0709162294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1534 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] Knin, 7 Sep (TANJUG)—Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, co-chairmen of the conference on former Yugoslavia, accompanied by their deputies, Ambassadors Geert Ahrens and Kai Eide, had talks in Knin today with the top state leadership of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] about the continuation of the peace process and negotiations on economic relations and cooperation between the RSK and Croatia.

As Lord Owen told journalists, they spoke about the implementation of the Zagreb cease-fire agreement.

In this regard, Owen expressed certain concerns saying that the implementation of that agreement was the main duty and responsibility of the UN forces.

He could not say anything more about the continuation of the Serb-Croat dialogue on economic relations, apart from the fact that Ambassadors Ahrens and Eide have taken, as he said, operative tasks which may mean that talks could be resumed soon.

RSK President Milan Martic said that an obstacle to the continuation of the negotiations is Article 12 of Security Council Resolution 820 which places not only Yugoslavia, but also the RSK, in some kind of economic quarantine and that, as a result, it is necessary to get rid of at least this article in the resolution.

He added that Stoltenberg, who is going to New York next week, will seek a clarification of this and some other resolutions relating to Krajina, and especially those on the deployment of UN observers on the border with the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In this connection, Martic informed the co-chairmen that the RSK borders and the whole of its territory have been under the control of the peacekeeping forces for two years now. Ultimately, the RSK parliament will decide on the deployment of observers, Martic stressed.

Martic made the reopening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway conditional on the return of refugees from western Slavonia to their homes and on the proclamation of this region as a safe area.

In any case, Martic concluded, both the Serbian and the Croatian sides must benefit from the reopening of the highway and there must be no concessions.

Martic assessed the talks as beneficial, adding that co-chairmen Owen and Stoltenberg showed understanding for the problems of Krajina.

Italian Convoy Carries Aid to Bihac Refugees

AU0709151194 Paris AFP in English 1440 GMT 7 Sep 94

[Text] Rome, Sept 7 (AFP)—A convoy of six Italian lorries left the Croatian capital Zagreb under UN escort Wednesday, loaded with 40 tonnes of supplies for refugees from the Bihac enclave in northern Bosnia, the Foreign Ministry said.

It was the first of several Italian aid convoys heading for a UN- protected area south of Zagreb where some 25,000 refugees from Bihac are living.

Bihac, a former separatist Moslem enclave which borders on Croatia, fell to the Bosnian Army last month.

When the refugees fled, they were trapped in a strip of land between Croatian defensive positions and others held by Serbs in the breakaway Krajina region of Croatia.

Tudjman Answers Questions at News Conference

LD0709153694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 7 Sep 94

[News conference given by President Franjo Tudjman in the presidential palace, Zagreb—live]

[Text] [Curic] Jozo Curic, Croatian TV. Mr. President, could you comment in brief on the Holy Father's visit to Croatia, and the postponement of his visit to Sarajevo.

[Tudjman] It was expected that the Holy Father's visit to Sarajevo was unlikely to happen under the present circumstances, even though his visit to Sarajevo would have been of great political importance. Of course, I am speaking about the state and political importance of the visit both to Sarajevo and Croatia. Others can speak about the pastoral importance.

The Holy Father's visit to Croatia is, without any exaggeration, of real historic importance both for the Croatian nation and the Croatian state. First of all, one should proceed from the fact that this visit became possible only after the independent and sovereign state of Croatia, a democratic state, was established, in which conditions were created for the normal functioning of the Catholic church and all other churches in their religious mission. Therefore, the Holy Father's visit to Croatia represents a recognition of this and of the Croatian state in the form that it was created by the will of the Croatian nation during the changes that took place in this historical period in Europe.

The Holy Father's visit is also of particular importance because he is coming at a time when critical decisions are to be made both by the Croatian government and the international community—the European Union and the United Nations—on what is going to happen to the peace forces in Croatia, and, since we are most frequently connected to the problems of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on how the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina is going to develop.

The Holy Father is coming as an apostle of peace, a preacher of cooperation and friendship between nations, but the Holy Father and the Vatican, by their policies,

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are making the point, using Croatia as an example, that every nation as well as every person has the right to self-defense.

So the coming of the Holy Father to Croatia in the current circumstances also means moral support from him as the supreme international moral authority, and support for the Croatian demand that Croatia has the right to establish the legal system throughout its territory, the right to achieve this with the help of the international community in a peaceful way—something advocated by Croatian state policy and the Holy Father too—but at the same time it means the right to remove injustice by all legal means if this is not possible in any other way.

Therefore, as far as the Croatian nation and its sovereign state are concerned, the Holy Father's visit is of great importance. This visit will undoubtedly have an impact not only on public opinion in Croatia, but also on the public opinion of our opponents who oppose Croatia's territorial integrity, and on those international players who are also taking part in the resolution of our problems both in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. But I will speak about this my welcoming speech when the Holy Father arrives on Croatian soil, and even later on his departure.

[Al-Isa] Nada Al-Isa, Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio-Television. Mr. President, both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatian politicians have recently been saying and admitting officially that the [Muslim- Croat] federation is coming into being more slowly than was planned and than we all wished. My question is: Since Croatia was the first to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina, do you see the project of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation as a way of preserving the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or do you believe that its division is more realistic? Thank you.

[Tudjman] The solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina depends on the actual situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it also depends on the involvement and decisions of international players—Europe and the United States, and the whole world through the United Nations.

We recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of our principled stances, because we wanted normal relations to be established between all states in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. We also accepted the Washington agreement on the setting up of the Bosniak-Muslim-Croat federation and its confederation with Croatia in order not only to end the conflict between Muslims and Croats, but also to find a final solution to the crisis in Bosnia- Herzegovina as soon as possible.

I do not want to speak now about what will happen to Bosnia- Herzegovina and what solution will be found because these would be speculations and, in any event, we are interested in seeing an end to the war and a solution being found which will create preconditions for a permanent and stable new international order in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Of course, it would be best—and this is what the international community has been pursuing—to find a solution within Bosnia-Herzegovina acceptable to all three constituent nations in Bosnia.

[Journalist] Mr. President, do you too think that the teachers' strike is somehow aimed at toppling the government and the authorities in Croatia, that this is a strategy conceived in some people's heads [as heard]?

[Tudjman] I would not have anything to add to what Prime Minister Valentic has said. I think that he has explained the Croatian government's stance.

For my part, in reply to your question, I can say that I have received telephone calls and letters from different parts of Croatia, particularly from Croatian defenders who also say that neither do they, on the first frontlines, have sufficiently high salaries, as high as they should have. Other citizens have been telling me the same. But they are aware that this government of the democratic Croatia, this democratic government, has no other task but to take care of the well-being of all Croatian citizens, including the teachers, professors. Because, the teaching profession is of great national importance for the state, because they are bringing up children from the earliest age, from kindergartens, through elementary schools up to secondary schools.

Therefore, they ought to be satisfied, but the Croatian government, as Prime Minister Valentic said, cannot go on rewarding, paying beyond its means, unless it wishes to bring into question the overall economic development, the overall stabilization; in that area we have achieved considerable results by pursuing the current policy, I daresay, amazing results even for the most serious economic observers in the world.

Therefore, this is the only way, the policy pursued by the government, to try to improve the salaries as soon as possible, both teachers' salaries and salaries of all other citizens.

It is really astonishing; I had an opportunity to talk to some trade union leaders. They themselves were surprised, and some citizens even asked why we are permitting some trade union people to do such things that are obviously detrimental both to education, to the people, and to Croatia in the current circumstances. My reply was: Unfortunately, as a saying goes, it is the price that we have to pay to our democratic principles—to resolve all such issues in a democratic way.

However, it is to be expected that such moves will be assessed accordingly both by citizens and you, reporters, who comment on such developments; individuals should not be permitted, for their old or new intentions, career ambitions, and as you said in your question—maybe for some strategic intentions out of their disagreement with such democratic Croatia—to initiate such moves, such

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unreasonable things, which cannot be justified by anything, taking into objective account Croatia's current circumstances.

[Journalist] Andrey [name indistinct] of the Russian news agency, ITAR-TASS. Mr. President, are there any changes in Zagreb's official stance in relation to the occupied areas of Croatia? Do you draw a link now between this question and the lifting of sanctions against Belgrade or will the development of bilateral relations with Knin have priority?

[Tudjman] We continue to be in favor of political negotiations in order to reach solutions, but at the same time we are determined that we can no longer tolerate procrastination over the return of these territories to the constitutional and legal system of Croatia.

So we will enter into negotiations. We know that the key still lies with Belgrade, and it is to be expected that they will in Belgrade understand those have incited, armed and, maintained not only the rebellion in Croatia but also the occupation of these Croatian areas—that they will understand that they must publicly renounce their support for the Knin Serbs and those who are opposed to peaceful solutions and negotiations, especially now when a deep rift has come about in Serb policy in connection with the question of whether to go for a military or a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

So it is to be expected that those responsible in Belgrade will make it known whether they are for a political solution in the same sense as guaranteed by Croatia's constitutional law—cultural and ethnic rights for the Serb ethnic community as a whole in Croatia and territorial, self-managing autonomy in the two districts where they were in the majority before the war, in Glina and Knin. So they should understand and talk to those people who might want to continue to maintain a situation which for Croatia really is untenable.

Croatia can no longer tolerate—because of Okucani—the division of eastern Slavonia and western Croatia. Croatia cannot indefinitely tolerate a situation in which Knin is causing the division of Dalmatia and northern Croatia. So we are resolutely seeking the beginning of the implementation of the Vance plan and Security Council Resolution 679 on the control of the border between Serbia, or rather their Yugoslavia, and Croatia, and the beginning of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 871 on the gradual normalization in the first instance of road communications and all other infrastructural problems and the resolution of all other legal and social questions linked to the incorporation of these currently occupied areas into the constitutional and legal system of Croatia.

And of course, we will insist on a link being drawn between the sanctions against Serbia and the resolution of the problems of the occupied areas of Croatia. In this respect we are resolute.

In the talks I have had over the past few days with international representatives—and last night with Lord Owen and Stoltenberg who are here with their colleagues Kai Eide and Ahrens—on these issues, I let it be known that we are for negotiations and political solutions and also that we are not in favor of any kind of concessions, and especially not in favor of some kind of new sanctions in return for some kind of solutions they might accept. Where do they get the idea of fresh concessions from? There can be no question of this.

So there can be no extension of the UN Protection Force's [UNPROFOR] mandate unless a beginning is made in the implementation of the resolutions so far and unless UNPROFOR and the Security Council give guarantees that this problem will begin to be resolved within the framework of Croatia's constitutional and legal system.

[Journalist] Mr. President, on several occasions you confirmed your adherence to the agreements between Croats and Bosniaks, or rather, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, there have recently been media reports both in Bosnia and here, and even some incidents in Bosnia, which remind one of the bygone conflicts between the two sides. Do you believe that another conflict could break out between the Muslim Bosniaks and Croats, or can you see a future for the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Thank you.

[Tudjman] We not only accepted, but were the initiators of the Washington agreement because we believed that it was in the interest of the Croatian nation and the Croatian state, of the whole of the Croatian nation, therefore including the Croat nation in Bosnia- Herzegovina and the Muslim nation as well.

In the same way, it was clear that the Croat people in Bosnia- Herzegovina could not accept a federation—because our experiences from the former Yugoslav federation were too bitter—unless that federation and the equal status of the Croat nation in Bosnia- Herzegovina were guaranteed by a confederal relationship with Croatia.

I believe that we can all agree that in the beginning we made more and faster achievements than expected in the implementation of the Washington agreement—in the cessation of hostilities and in the creation of preconditions for the implementation of the agreement—especially considering all the events that preceded the agreement.

There is a certain opposition now. With full responsibility, I can say that the current Croat leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina is in favor of implementing the agreement. If there is any opposition among Croats, these are only individual and sporadic cases. On the other hand, there are examples—both in everyday life and in some Muslim papers—of open opposition to the creation of the federation and confederation. This is what gives cause for concern. But I believe that these are

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also marginal difficulties and that we will manage to overcome them. I also believe that the conflict between Croats and Muslims will not flare up again.

You have probably seen—what is that newspaper called, LJILJAN, which published an article a few days ago, drawing wrong conclusions. There were statements, and not only in that issue, explicitly saying or implying that as they [Muslims] finished off Abdic, they will finish off other para- states and para-military formations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is very worrying. This would mean [changes thought], please, if the war against the Serb aggressor is justified, the war against the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna—which was born in the struggle against the Serb aggressor, and which will exist, as envisaged by the Washington agreement, until everything planned for the federation and confederation is achieved—is not justified. I believe that these difficulties and misunderstandings will be removed in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself. Additionally, on 13 September I will have a meeting with President Izetbegovic, with the Bosniak Muslim and Croat leaderships to discuss all specific issues and principles.

We should remember that, in line with Croatia's policy and our positive efforts in the past, President Zubak suggested that ambassadors of the countries involved in the implementation of the Washington agreement, that is, the United States, Germany, Turkey, and Croatia should help solve controversial issues in the areas where representatives of the Muslim and Croat nations in Bosnia- Herzegovina cannot agree on specific issues, which is not at all easy, considering all circumstances.

I do not know whether you have the following piece of information: 180,000 Croats fled or were driven out of the territory under the control of Muslim forces, while less then 50,000 [Muslims] fled or—please, let us be objective—were driven out of the territory under the control of Croat forces. Therefore, three times as many Croats. So, we cannot say that the return of refugees should be organized on a one-to-one basis. This problem should be viewed in its entirety.

We in Croatia and the Croat leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina were in favor of allowing everyone—Croats and Muslims—to return, and in favor of doing this on the basis of a mutual accord, not a formal agreement, but an accord which would in essence be in the interest of both peoples and in the interest of both federation and confederation.

[Journalist] Deutsche Welle. Mr. President, at the beginning when the UN forces came to Croatia, their then commander Satish Nambiar said they were there to preserve peace between two belligerent sides. The occupied zone of Croatia was declared a UN- protected area. Among the international public the impression is being gained that these people and this area should be protected from someone, i.e. the Croatian authorities. And slowly it is being forgotten that it was there that a rebellion was started by force of arms. Can and will Croatia allow this fact to be forgotten so easily? Thank you.

[Tudjman] I have already answered that question. These protected areas were not set up in order to protect only the Serb population but all the people. As you know, even after the arrival of the peace-keeping forces, the expulsion of both Croats and all other non-Serbs was continued. But UNPROFOR is not to blame for this policy, the Serbs are to blame. After all, it is the Serbs who prevented the implementation of the Vance plan and the Security Council resolutions. So we will either seek changes in the UNPROFOR mandate to enable it to carry out its task or UNPROFOR will not obtain any more mandates, and we will then ourselves try to introduce the constitutional and legal system throughout the territory of Croatia.

[Modric] Mr. President, Sanja Modric, NOVI LIST and GLAS ISTRE. Could you say, explicitly, are you for or against the lifting of the embargo on the import of arms to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia? I would also like to ask [unidentified speaker interrupts]—afterwards. One question at a time.

From the beginning up until today, in talks with the most responsible people in world politics, I have represented the view of Croatia that it is oriented toward arriving as soon as possible, with the help of the international community, at a political solution. When a year ago the question of the lifting of the embargo was raised, we pointed out that above all the lifting of the embargo should really be linked not only to Bosnia-Herzegovina but to Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia, and that the lifting of the embargo would mean that the international community was helpless in finding and imposing political solutions.

This would mean that the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia- Herzegovina should be sought in the resumption of the war. But this war in Bosnia-Herzegovina could take on worrying proportions in view of who could become involved. It is well known to our public and the world's public that on the Serb side there are volunteers from the former Soviet Union, later Russia, and that on the Muslim side there were volunteers from Islamic countries—mojahedin and so on.

This means in a way that at this crossroads of civilization, where it was by no means a coincidence that the First World War was sparked off, wide-ranging and civilization-wide clashes could have come about. This is what one has to bear in mind when efforts are made to find solutions to prevent the extension of this conflict and danger, not only for this region but for Europe and the world.

I believe that I have been sufficiently clear but, in my answer to the question before, I said that if there are no other solutions then each nation has the right to defense and, the international community must allow some

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problems to be solved by other means if there are no political means. But, as I said, I believe, when we talk about the embargo, that we should bear this in mind. Steps should be taken, if it comes to this, to prevent, prevent the spreading of the conflict and everything about which I have spoken.

[Boljes] Drazen Boljes, GLAS SLAVONIJE. Mr. President, I would like to ask you to comment briefly on the resignation of Branimir Glavas as chairman of his Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] county committee. Could you tell us: Was this resignation really a voluntary act or was it a discreet suggestion by the state leadership recently in Brijuni, as the media are speculating; and will the possible departure of Glavas from the HDZ in his county lead to tremors in the ruling party after the [word indistinct] functioning of the HDZ in eastern Slavonia?

[Tudjman] I don't know. After all the experiences we have had in our efforts to provoke crises in parliament and so on, the attempt at a split—why it should occur to someone that this resignation, for whatever reason, could provoke a crisis in the HDZ [sentence as heard]. However, I say with responsibility, the resignation of Mr. Glavas was not motivated by any political motives—either his own or those of the political leadership—but was simply the implementation of the decisions we adopted in order to try to prevent a county chairman and a chairman of the HDZ in that county being the same person. This is a decision we adopted after the second assembly of the HDZ and we are trying to implement it everywhere.

So what Mr. Glavas wrote and what has been published in the press—at least what I have seen—is the pure truth [as heard]. I myself have had talks with him and there is no fear whatsoever that this could provoke any conflict or that there is anything else in the motives for his resignation other than to free himself from these duties in view of the other duties he is performing.

Excuse me, there is someone over there who has had their hand up for a very long time. I fear that [laughs].

[Ramljak] Olga Ramljak, SLOBODNA DALMACIJA. It might seem to you that my question to some extent overlaps with some questions that have already been put to you. An Assembly session devoted to the UNPROFOR mandate is to be held, you are to visit New York and address the UN Security Council.

[Tudjman, interrupting] The UN General Assembly.

[Ramljak] Thank you for correcting me. Mr. President, what are you going to demand on behalf of Croatia from the UN peace forces in Croatia? Is it going to be direct protection of Croatian borders, and the final return of refugees as had been planned, not according to a one-for-one agreement as has been implemented in Croatia [as heard]? Will this include the right for Croatia to stop tolerating, for example, opening fire on Cilipi [Dubrovnik airport]?

[Tudjman] I think that I have already answered your question. In any case, we will be completely resolute in our demands as regards reintegration of the occupied territory into Croatia's legal and constitutional order. We will coordinate our policy with our allies, who advised us not to provoke the conflict on our part. But we will, as we have shown in the Maslenica example, most certainly take steps that will be necessary for our justified demands, demands of the entire Croatian nation, particularly refugees to return to their homes—that we will take steps to gain effective help from the international community in this respect, or to gain their understanding for everything that we will have to do in case the political efforts prove to be futile.

As regards the shelling of Cilipi, as you can see no shell has fallen on the airport itself thus rendering it non-functional. Those who are firing shells there, which are far from not being dangerous, are nevertheless cautious. Namely, they want to show that they are an integral part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, since Bosnia- Herzegovina had access to the sea at Neum, they now think that they have a right to access to the sea.

Apart from that, you may know, while defending Dubrovnik from the Serb aggression, from capturing the entire area up to the Neretva, we repelled the Serb forces and the former Yugo-communist army and the Serb forces from the area around Dubrovnik. We are holding those areas for the safety of Dubrovnik. Therefore, this is an open issue, and with this shelling they just wish to remind us that this is an issue that needs resolving. In any case, even on this example we will prove that we are taking care of the Croatian state and national interests.

[Ramljak] You mentioned earlier that when the blue forces arrived for the first time they signed an agreement for the territory of the former Yugoslavia in Belgrade. Will Croatia, as a sovereign state, finally have a chance to sign its own mandate for UNPROFOR?

[Tudjman] No one speaks any more about any Croatian signature being tied to anyone else's signature. These conditions existed then, in the transitional period. As you know, the disintegration of a state system, especially a multi-ethnic one, and the creation of new states is a very complex and complicated business and problem, especially from the point of view of international law.

[Journalist] DANAS weekly. Mr. President, I would like to ask a question about internal politics. It is about frequent mentions in the press this summer of personnel changes in the state leadership. Prime Minister Valentic has already announced certain changes in the government. I would like to ask you whether there will be any changes in the party and in your office.

In this context, I would like to put an additional, not a second question. Mr. (Velimir Tvica) polemicized in VJESNIK with Hrvoje Sosic and in that context mentioned you. There is a small quotation mentioning Hrvoje Sosic: Instead of dealing with twits among his

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own people and looking for the culprits for the problems in Croatia's current economic, political, and international position in the wrong moves, misconceptions, and meanderings of the people in power who could do something—which means looking in the mirror, because Sosic is the closest confidant of our president, who personally appointed him to the assembly, the person who allegedly appoints his advisers and dismisses his ministers, and so on. Could you please comment on this, because there have been no comments from your office?

[Tudjman] What is the gentleman who wrote that?

[Journalist] The former minister of information.

[Tudjman] All the better for that. I am hearing for the first time, of course, that Mr. Sosic is—what did you say?—President Tudjman's most reliable confidant. I appointed Hrvoje Sosic member of the Chamber of Counties as one of my five appointees, not as my friend or ally, but as the representative of the Croats who were persecuted in the former communist Yugoslavia, and on several occasions as well, immediately after the war and later. Hrvoje Sosic was appointed to represent those people.

And the fact that a man can write—after everything that happened over the past four and a half years—that he appoints my advisers and ministers, is really strange, and it is even stranger that such a man could have been the minister of science in the socialist Croatia.

I am a man who knows that a clever man should listen to and can learn things from the biggest fool, an opponent or even an enemy, while a fool cannot learn even from a sage.

But I hope that our public knows that no one can impose upon this president either advisers or ministers, or any decision. I will listen to everyone, but I will make the decisions only in the interest of Croatia, and I hope that the reality has proved that my judgments and conclusions contain everything but a basis for such—let me say, I cannot find the word—deep-seated stupidity.

As regards the second part of your question, Prime Minister Valentic has said that certain government reshuffles would take place in order to improve the effectiveness of the government and its departments; they are also aimed at strengthening it; all changes due to take place both in the government and other top institutions are aimed at strengthening the top state and political leadership, and creating conditions on the basis of all our experience so far, for even more successful management of our state.

I think that both our and the international public know that really in the political, by the stability of our democratic order, in the international arena, by Croatia's position in the world today where it has both allies and friends unlike several years ago, and even in the economic field, that we have achieved results that astonish many people; many experts, political and economic, are almost unable to understand how we have managed to do it [sentence as heard].

The fact that Croatia is today a country with the lowest inflation, the fact that we have a stable currency which is a precondition for the stability of our economy, from small businesses or an ordinary family, up to huge economic systems, the fact that we have in every respect acquired a basis for the continuation of such a policy—this gives us a basis for the government, in somewhat changed, and generally that in the continuation of our policy we build up on the foundations with such people with whom we have achieved it, and obviously we will be endeavoring to improve the system and the cadre solutions in that respect [sentence as heard].

Within this context some changes in the HDZ secretariat are likely to take place. Consequently, all this is aimed at continuing this successful policy and, naturally, resolving the problems that we have at the moment, which we were unable to solve so far, which will always exist and without which life is unthinkable, which encourage us to seek people and ways to resolve them as successfully as possible, which is in the interest of all Croatian citizens, the entire Croatian state, and even in the interest of the international community, because this democratic and stable Croatia is needed today by the main European and international players as the state on which one can count in the establishment and building of the new international order in this part of southeast Europe and the neighboring Balkans.

[Modric] Modric, YOMIURI SHIMBUN. Mr. President, in three weeks' time you will go to New York where you are going to address the UN General Assembly. This is also an opportunity to meet heads of state. Could you tell us who you want to meet during your stay in New York and which meetings have already been scheduled? Thank you.

[Tudjman] This matter is still being discussed. Understandably, I would like to meet those statesmen who play the most important roles in European and world politics and, consequently, in resolving the problems in the area of the former Yugoslavia. I will be in particular meeting such people while the UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali is going to host a special lunch for the heads of state there. There will certainly be interesting meetings and important talks.

[Kokic] Davor Kokic, HRVATSKI VOJNI [words indistinct] the Ministry for Defense. Mr. President, I would like to ask you to briefly assess the Croatian Army regarding its duties in the future. Is there a possibility of Croatian officers being trained in foreign countries?

[Tudjman] The Croatian Army's role and duties are as clear as any other army's. This is particularly so in the case of an army such as Croatia's, given the fact that Croatia faces the task of establishing its sovereignty across all its areas at a time when the Croatian Army

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must also secure the borders of the Croatian state. Consequently, the building of our armed force is a permanent duty. I believe that the exercise in Vir, performed by units of all the branches of our armed force, army units, the navy, and the air force, demonstrated the level of combat and technical preparedness the Croatian Army has reached. However, according to some of your reports, I ended up with a heart attack after the exercise [laughs].

As for your second question, we are, of course, already holding concrete talks about sending Croatian officers to training centers in friendly countries which have long-established systems and which can teach them all kinds of things.

[Journalist] Mr. President, there is a tendency in Istria at present to obtain dual citizenship. As things stand at the moment, the Istrian leadership, i.e. the Istrian Democratic Alliance, has not declared itself on this issue. As far as we know, those who have done so were the priests of the Porec bishopric, who were supported by the priests of [word indistinct]. We know that Slovenia has the same problem. The Slovene government reacted to it. Can you comment on these events?

[Tudjman] As for your question and the information you gave, one should add that—apart from the clergy—intellectuals in Istria took their stand on dual citizenship, as far as I know. There was no particular need for the government to react to this, because our consistent policy is to strengthen Istria's position within the Croatian state in all aspects, especially by caring for economic and cultural development.

Of course, this is one of the more perfidious methods of attempting to destabilize the Croatian authorities in the area, and of ensuring long-term intentions to claim a right to Istria on the part of—let us be honest—not only openly fascist circles, but also on the part of covert irridentist ones. This is something the whole of the Croatian public and the Croatian authorities should certainly deal with and, in their own way, inform the uninformed people who believe this, possibly because they are uninformed. We must also take steps to prevent this from happening.

[Badurina] Ingrid Badurina, LA STAMPA. Mr. President, what is your comment on the Russian foreign minister's statement following your meeting in Zagreb? He said that sanctions on Belgrade were not linked to the situation in Croatia's protected areas. In other words, it is increasingly evident that there are differing views within the Contact Group. What is the significance of this as regards Croatia's future?

[Tudjman] I do not know what minister Kozyrev said in the wake of our meeting. In our talks this matter was touched upon and I agreed that these sanctions on Serbia had been imposed primarily because of Bosnia. He had to agree with me, though, that they had also been imposed partly because of Krajina and that they were linked to Krajina and that we could not accept such a view. I said that we would persist among our friends and allies in linking the lifting of sanctions to a solution for Krajina.

I believe, on the whole, that we should say that Russia and minister Kozyrev and his deputy Churkin in the course of their talks with us, and even in my presence, and in their talks with Milosevic and others in Geneva, tried to make Serbia recognize Croatia within its border and establish diplomatic relations. Consequently, on their part they, Russia's diplomacy, have exerted their influence, so the problem of Serbs in Croatia could be solved in a political way, in the spirit of UN Security Council resolutions, i.e. indicating that they are within Croatia. Hence, so far Russia has been playing a positive role.

We will see how relations will evolve within the Contact Group as regards Moscow. As far as we can see, we are still witnessing its efforts to harmonize the policies of the United States, Russia, and the European Union toward this matter.

[Journalist] Mr. President, in my view it was inexcusable to bypass a topical and a very difficult question, that is, the problem of the refugee crisis in connection with people from Abdic's para- state in western Bosnia. Given that you, not just your most senior aides, but you personally, had strongly favored Mr. Abdic—and we all remember this—tell us what you would say about Abdic and his army now.

[Tudjman] First of all, it is not true that I and my aides had—according to you—strongly favored Abdic. Such a statement does not correspond to the truth. It is true that I personally considered Mr. Fikret Abdic as a Muslim politician who was present in the politics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who obtained more votes than Izetbegovic in the elections, either for the Presidency or for the Party of Democratic Action leadership, and had absolute influence in western Bosnia.

I also knew—it was not unknown either to me or to my aides—that Mr. Abdic cooperated with the Serbs, as well as with us and with UNPROFOR, and that he cleverly used this as an excuse when he told us that he saved the Cazin Krajina, western Bosnia, from war in this way. Even at the time when we were concluding both public and secret agreements [laughs] with Mr. Izetbegovic about a confederation, well before the Washington agreements, Mr. Abdic declared himself in favor of such a policy of cooperation between Muslims and Croats.

Mr. Abdic also accepted the Washington agreements. Regardless of the fact that the public was aware of this, I was convinced that Mr. Abdic, by declaring himself in favor of a federation, a confederation and the Washington agreements, was sincere in his actions in this respect, because he had built his entire agricultural combine on cooperation with Croatia—with Karlovac,

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Rijeka, Zagreb—with northern Croatia. He had economic ties with Croatia. This area has transport and economic ties with Croatia anyway. It was quite normal to accept his declaration in favor of the Washington agreements as sincere.

Apart from that, during the talks we had, he said he was prepared for talks with Messrs Izetbegovic and Silajdzic. When I was in Sarajevo Messrs Izetbegovic and Silajdzic agreed that a political solution should be found. They accepted my proposal that my aides should arrange a meeting between Abdic and Silajdzic and that all this be resolved in a way which would help consolidate the Muslim- Croat federation and consequently, which would be in the interest of letting everyone know that the entire Muslim leadership was in favor of implementing these agreements and in favor of a pro-western orientation.

Mr. Abdic warned, and his newspapers and statements no doubt mentioned it, that some Muslim ranks contained too many mojaheddin elements which would favor extremist or fundamentalist solutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, unacceptable to his people in the Bihac Krajina.

I can only regret the fact that the efforts of Mr. Granic, whom I charged with organizing a meeting between Abdic and Silajdzic, failed and that the events have taken such a turn that Muslims have started to settle accounts by fighting among themselves and that tens of thousands of people have been brought into a truly unenviable position.

[Moderator] This is the end of the news conference. Thank you and good-bye.

[Tudjman] Thank you. Good-bye.

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Federal

Jovanovic Calls UN Sanctions Obstacle to Peace

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[Interview with Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic by Petr Pravda; in Belgrade on 1 September: "Jovanovic: Sanctions Are the Greatest Obstacle to Peace"]

[Text] Belgrade (From our special correspondent)—*Vladislav Jovanovic, foreign minister of Serbo-Montenegrin Yugoslavia, is an experienced Serbian diplomat, who was, among other things, ambassador to Turkey and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During the talks with Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra in Belgrade on Thursday [1 September], we asked Jovanovic for an interview on the current situation in former Yugoslavia.*

[Pravda] Why is Belgrade rejecting the deployment of international observers at the border between Serbia and the territory controlled by Bosnian Serbs?

[Jovanovic] The Federal Government has decided, in view of the situation, to sever all political and economic relations with Bosnian Serbs, and it strictly abides by this. No one in the world can control this border better than we ourselves. We regard the calls for some kind of international control as a secondary problem. It even seems to us that this might be linked to other objectives that have nothing to do with peace.

[Pravda] The deployment of observers is viewed in Belgrade as a step that is aimed directly against the sovereignty of your country. Why?

[Jovanovic] I repeat again that we have decided, in a completely sovereign manner, to sever relations, and this is why it is unnecessary for foreigners to somehow check that we actually did so. On the other hand, this step only applies to our relations with Bosnian Serbs, and no one from abroad can manage them better than we. Foreigners cannot have a say in Serbian-Serbian matters. Our decision is based on the effort to establish peace and on the realism of our policy, which stands against the non-realism of the Bosnian Serbs. The moment our peace efforts are accepted by their leaders, the severance of relations will lose its justification. We expect from the world that it will fairly evaluate our efforts and will not force a solution upon us that could harm peace.

[Pravda] Representatives of the international community believe, however, that your approval of the deployment of observers could be regarded as a way leading to the lifting of the anti- Belgrade sanctions.

[Jovanovic] The UN has made the lifting of sanctions conditional on Yugoslavia meeting all the conditions ensuing from UN Security Council Resolution No. 757. However, Yugoslavia has already met them, and demonstrated this fact graphically by the aforesaid action against the Bosnian Serbs. Therefore it is now the Security Council's turn to fulfill its promise. If they try to circumvent it and create new conditions to prolong the sanctions, then there are some undeclared goals behind it, but no peace efforts. We expect the sanctions to be lifted. This must be done immediately. It they are extended, so will the war in Bosnia be extended. The sanctions are the greatest obstacle to peace.

[Pravda] Have you received any signals recently that would herald the sanctions' limitation or abolition?

[Jovanovic] In my talks with Mr. Vondra, I expressed the expectation that the Czech Republic—as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council and a country that is close to this region and has had traditionally good relations with Yugoslavia—would play an important role in the UN, that it would contribute a new view of this problem, and would not imitate the policy of the others. I expressed the wish that we remain in political contact and develop comprehensive bilateral relations to be prepared for intensive cooperation that could start once the sanctions are lifted.

[Pravda] What do you think about the United States' efforts to lift the embargo on arms deliveries to Bosnian Muslims?

[Jovanovic] You cannot speak of peace and prepare for war at the same time. The country that does this should explain it to the world. Preparations for war have never led to peace. We want to hope that the endeavor of all countries is to fight for a peace that has been proposed by peaceful means. The potential lifting of the embargo would only lead to an uncontrolled crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, maybe, outside it as well. No country can say that the peace process cannot be strengthened any more. The countries of the so-called contact group and members of the UN Security Council, including the Czech Republic, can do the most in this regard.

[Pravda] Nevertheless, the American "yes" to lifting the embargo on arms deliveries is only a reaction to the Serbian "no" to the peace plan. It was, above all, the Bosnian Serbs' step that was directed against peace, and the Americans are only reacting to it now.

[Jovanovic] Certainly. What the Serbs from Bosnia did was not good. It would have been better had they accepted the plan. And I believe that this is what they finally will do. However, I also think that their decision was governed by psychological reasons, rather than political ones. There is a suicidal complex involved, provoked by the feeling of collective threat. I believe that others have enough room for some political and psychological action to rid the Bosnian Serbs of their fear. If they are given additional guarantees, they could find out that the contact group's plan is good for them, too.

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Serbia

Milosevic Gives Support to 'Final' Peace Plan

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[Text] Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, is visiting Vranje today. An hour ago, President Milosevic commissioned the new Jumko plant. During the occasion, President Milosevic said the following:

[Begin Milosevic recording] [applause] Dear people of Vranje, workers of the textile mill, citizens of Vranje, I am very glad that I can be in Vranje today and be able to enjoy the opportunity to be together with you today. Above all I would like to congratulate all of you, as well as all citizens of Vranje, on the 50th anniversary of liberation from the fascist occupiers and their domestic helpers, the 50 years of life in freedom [applause], which is the greatest token of people's interests and which, for that very reason, we must always cherish it—never regretting the price and denials—as the most precious thing that is the basis of the development of every people.

I would also like to congratulate you on your high work results, both in the textile mill and in the whole of Vranje. This factory alone, which we are going to commission today, shows how much strength and work, how much wisdom and wise decisions with far- reaching business visions have been built into the results that [word indistinct] this combine and the economy of this town in general. It is almost unbelievable that, within the last three years of the great economic crisis, the textile combine increased the number of its employees by several thousand people. People who are not in the know find it hard to believe what great capabilities this nation possesses and what great capabilities these people and this country possess so as to be able to build—without anybody else's help—such a modern factory, whose value of 35 million dinars represents a huge investment, considering our present conditions and the circumstances of work and the functioning of our economy under the pressures of the international community. These results are so much greater—and this speaks of the vitality of our country and our people, of the vitality of our economy—as these results have been achieved under great pressure and under the conditions of the sanctions. The fact that we managed to achieve such results under pressures and under the sanctions should not be interpreted as if pressures and sanctions suit us and as if we want to live under pressures and sanctions. On the contrary, we think that we should get rid of them as soon as possible and that we should reintegrate into the international community as soon as possible as an equal people and equal country, with the full cooperation of our neighboring regions. [applause]

I think that you will all remember that, several years ago, when we were entering this great Yugoslav crisis, we defined the aims of our policy. We defined three main aims. I shall remind you: These were peace, economic and cultural development, and the struggle against crime. Led by our interests in attaining such aims, we have led the policy that saved our country from war and, at the same time, saved all its citizens and the entire Serbian people from the pressures, from destruction, and from being conquered and losing its freedom. Such a consistent policy, which was exposed to huge pressures by the international community, has achieved success, because, as we know very well, the final and latest peace plan that was proposed by the international community represents a solution that cannot be considered biased, as the proposed solution was to carry out territorial division on a half-half principle. I would say it is a fair solution that makes possible further improvements through the means of negotiations and peace not through the means of war, new sufferings, and new denials.

It is hard to find any other people in the world that has accepted such great denials because of a part of it living outside its borders. We all know very well, all the citizens of Serbia, all the citizens of Vranje, all the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, how huge these denials were, so that our people outside Serbia, our people at the other side of the Drina, Vrbas, and Una Rivers can be free, equal, and realize their national interests. These denials are worth the results. What has been achieved is the Serbian Republic with half the territory of the former Bosnia- Herzegovina and with the opportunity to connect directly in a federation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We consider this to be an honorable proposal, a proposal that can be built upon further in bilateral relations, a proposal that should be a basis for all of us to turn to [word indistinct], construction, development, the the future of our children, and the future of future generations.

I would like to remind you: I think that the birds have learned to repeat our stand as it has been since the first day of the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have always stressed: A just peace is possible only if the interests of all three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina are equally protected. This stand has been reiterated from Brussels and The Hague to Belgrade and Geneva, to London and New York, all over the world. This is always the same stand; that peace is possible—a permanent and stable peace—only with the equal protection of the interests of all the three peoples living here. I think that the proposed peace plan grants a basis for achieving such a peace. We have therefore given our support for such a peace. I would like, once again, to share with you and our public my conviction that peace is the greatest interest [word indistinct] of [word indistinct] the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, all citizens of Serbia, and all citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the interests of all of the Serbian people, regardless of whether it is living on the left or the right bank of the Una or Vrbas Rivers, on the left of right banks of the Drina, the Morava, or the Timok Rivers. This is the greatest national interest of the whole of the Serbian people. Deciding to support this peace, we bore in mind

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equally the interests of the entire people. It is for this reason that this decision of ours enjoys such support in our country, and I am therefore sure that by enduring with our policy of peace, we are going to be a decisive factor in making peace finally come true on this seething Balkan peninsula and—instead of the zone of instability and, I would say, at times a zone of horror—having this Balkan territory become a zone of stability, a zone of cooperation, a zone of peace, and a zone of development.

Approaching these issues of a relation toward peace, we must keep in mind that we are the strongest and most populous people in the Balkans and that, therefore, we have an even greater obligation not to have our behavior harm the interests of smaller and weaker peoples living around us and together with us and an obligation to develop good relations and establish stability in the entire region.

Therefore, any aspirations that may resemble a demand for something that does not belong to us should be interpreted as the greatest blow dealt to the national interest of the Serbian people itself and the greatest blow to peace in the Balkans and the interest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Serbia, and all of its citizens. Therefore, I would like to convince you that we are going to endure in the policy of peace and manage to make it reign over these territories. Then we shall be able to have many such factories and to build and to ensure a cultural and economic development that would be the pride of these future generations and our entire people. In this name, I wish you all much success; this town, this region, the south of Serbia, and the whole of our republic. Long life! [applause] [end recording]

Changes in Serb Movement, Peace Prospects Viewed

LD0609170894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1247 GMT 6 Sep 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 6 Sep (TANJUG)—Ivan Kovacevic, spokesman of the Serbian Renaissance Movement [SPO], said today that, at a session of the party's presidium last night, party chairman Vuk Draskovic appointed Vojislav Vukcevic as secretary general and Gvozden Rosic and Aleksandar Cotric as members of the presidium.

Kovacevic also said at a news conference that the resignations of former secretary general Vladimir Gajic and vice chairman Mihajlo Markovic "were acknowledged" and added that resignations are a normal phenomenon in a party's life. [passage omitted]

Speaking about the Contact Group's announced activities, SPO Executive Committee Chairman Milan Komnenic said that, despite all opposition, the day when the peace deal on Bosnia will be signed "is not far away."

Komnenic said that he expects the international community to respond to the referendum in the Srpska republic and that their response will be "political, not military."

In his opinion, it is realistic that the Bosnian Serbs—like the Muslims and Croats—should be "given the option of a confederation." [passage omitted]

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